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PROTECTIVE FUNCTION PRIVILEGE AND ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE
KENNETH STARR INVESTIGATION
By Darren Welch
In an attempt to corroborate testimony given before the grand jury in the Kenneth Starr investigation
into an alleged affair with Monica Lewinski, Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr issued subpoenas to
Secret Service agents assigned to protect President Clinton. The Clinton administration unsuccessfully
asserted a claim of "protective function privilege" to shield the testimony of Secret Service agents. At
stake is potentially damaging testimony that may conflict with what President Clinton has said about his
relationship with Monica Lewinsky. Also at stake, so the Clinton administration argues, is the life of
the president. The Clinton administration is also fighting to shield the testimony of presidential aid
Bruce Lindsey, arguing that attorney-client privilege exists between the president and his deputy
counsel.
Starr is trying to determine if President Clinton lied about his relationship with Lewinsky and if he
urged her to deny an affair between the two. Because of their continuous proximity to the president and
their habit of careful observation, Starr believes Secret Service agents will provide credible witnesses
about Clinton's contancts with Lewinsky.
The Clinton administration claimed a protective function privilege to shield Secret Service testimony.
The administration argues that if a president knows his bodyguards are subject to a special prosecutor's
subpoena, he will distance himself from them and thus increase the possibility of a successful
assassination attempt.
The initial challenge to the subpoenas was heard by U.S. District Court Judge Norma Holloway
Johnson. Johnson ruled that the Secret Service did have to testify and rejected the argument that a
president would distance himself from his bodyguards, noting that self-interest would urge the president
to stay near his protectors. Johnson's ruling was upheld by the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist heard a motion for a stay of the
Secret Service's testimony until the full Supreme Court could hear an appeal, but Rehnquist ordered the
Secret Service to comply with the subpoenas, noting that the full court would not likely reverse the
Circuit Court's ruling. The Supreme Court may chose to hear the appeal in the future, but the point may
be moot by the time the full court reconvenes.
In a related issue, the Clinton administration tried to block the testimony of White House Deputy
Counsel Bruce Lindsey. Starr subpoenaed Lindsey to testify about conversations with Clinton and
about Lindsey's debriefing of witnesses and lawyers testifying before the Monica Lewinsky grand jury.
The Clinton administration claimed attorney client privilege to shield Lindsey's testimony, arguing
that all private attorneys arguing that to exempt government attorneys from the privilege would result
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in a lack of full disclosure between the president and his attorney's. The District Court ruled that the
privilege did not apply because it is not a government attorney's duty to protect clients from criminal
charges or to prevent public exposure. Citing "the public interest in honest government and in exposing
wrongdoing by government officials," the district court ordered Lindsey to testify. In a 2-1 decision,
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.
The Clinton administration is deciding whether to appeal the ruling to the Supreme Court. In June
1998, the Supreme Court ruled for the president in another claim of attorney-client privilege. The 6-3
ruling meant that Starr would not get three pages of handwritten notes taken five years ago by an
attorney for late White House Deputy Council Vince Foster.
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COURT REJECTS PRIVILEGE CLAIM; WHITE HOUSE LOSES APPEAL ON
SHIELDING ATTORNEY-CLIENT TALKS
The Washington Post
July 28, 1998
Ruth Marcus, Washington Post Staff Writer
The federal appeals court here yesterday rejected the White House's argument that President Clinton's
conversations with White House lawyers are shielded from disclosure by attorney-client privilege,
clearing the way for independent counsel Kenneth W. Starr to question deputy counsel Bruce R. Lindsey,
one of Clinton's closest confidants.
Invoking "the public interest in honest government and in exposing wrongdoing by government
officials," the appeals court panel ruled that White House attorneys -- like other government lawyers --
have a duty to respond to grand jury questions "seeking information relating to the possible commission
of a federal crime."
The 2 to 1 ruling opens the door for prosecutors to question not only Lindsey but other White House
lawyers about their conversations with Clinton relating to the Monica S. Lewinsky investigation. It also
has implications for lawyers throughout the government as well as future administrations.
In Lindsey's case, court papers indicate that prosecutors want to question him about his conversations
with Clinton as well as his debriefing of other witnesses in the case and their lawyers regarding their
grand jury testimony.
The ruling is the second by a federal appeals court rejecting the White House's claim of government
attorney-client privilege. And it is the latest in a series of legal setbacks that have included rulings
rejecting claims of executive privilege for Lindsey and other top aides and requiring grand jury testimony
by Secret Service agents.
White House counsel Charles F C. Ruff said the White House was "disappointed that the court of
appeals has decided that, unlike every other attorney and client in this country, government attorneys and
their clients do not enjoy the right to have confidential communications." In a statement, Ruff said, "The
practical result of the court's decision is that the president and all other government officials will be less
likely to receive full and frank advice about their official obligations and duties from government
attorneys."
Ruff said the White House was weighing whether to appeal the ruling. The White House could take
the case either to the full federal appeals court or to the Supreme Court, which had ordered the appeals
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court panel to hear the case on an expedited timetable. The appeals panel said the White House needed
to file any request for review by the full court within seven days, shorter than the usual timetable.
But the White House's prospects for success -- and for blocking testimony by White House lawyers
during an appeal -- appear dim. Another federal appeals court reached the same conclusion on attorney-
client privilege in a dispute involving lawyers' conversations with first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, a
ruling the Supreme Court refused to review.
And Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, in denying the administration's request that the Secret Service
agents' testimony be put off while the high court considers whether to review that ruling, suggested there
would not be any "irreparable harm" in allowing that testimony to go forward. Rehnquist could apply the
same reasoning to the attorney-client privilege issue.
The majority opinion yesterday stressed the different roles and responsibilities of government lawyers
and private attorneys. "With respect to investigations of federal criminal offenses, and especially offenses
committed by those in government, government attorneys stand in a far different position from members
of the private bar," it said. "Their duty is not to defend clients against criminal charges and it is not to
protect wrongdoers from public exposure."
The court rejected White House claims that the prospect of impeachment proceedings -- in which the
president could be represented by White House counsel -- buttressed its need for attorney-client
privilege. The court said that, if it comes to impeachment, such conversations might be covered by
executive privilege.
Two judges, A. Raymond Randolph, appointed by President George Bush, and Clinton appointee
Judith W. Rogers, ruled against the president in a 47-page opinion, parts of which were kept under seal.
Another Clinton appointee, David S. Tatel, supported the existence of a privilege and said presidents
"may well shift their trust on all but the most routine legal matters" to outside lawyers. He said the
majority, "by lumping the president together with tax collectors, passport application processors, and all
other executive branch employees," failed to take into account "the unique nature of the presidency, its
unique need for confidential legal advice, or the possible consequences of abrogating the attorney-client
privilege for a president's ability to obtain such advice."
Tatel warned that in the modern political world, with an independent counsel statute, congressional
investigations and aggressive media scrutiny, "no president can navigate the treacherous waters of post-
Watergate government, make controversial official legal decisions, decide whether to invoke official
privileges, or even know when he might need private counsel, without confidential legal advice."
357
The majority ruling went further than the initial decision on the case by U.S. District Judge Norma
Holloway Johnson, who ruled that a government attorney-client privilege exists but should be balanced
against prosecutors' needs for information.
The appeals panel rejected a balancing test and said government lawyers have a duty to provide
testimony to the grand jury. The court acknowledged its approach might chill conversations between
government officials and government lawyers, but said the high court found that risk acceptable in
establishing only limited protection for other presidential advisers under the doctrine of executive
privilege.
"Only a certain conceit among those admitted to the bar could explain why legal advice should be on
a higher plane than advice about policy, or politics, or why a president's conversation with the mostjunior lawyer in the White House counsel's office is deserving of more protection from disclosure than
a president's discussions with his vice president or a Cabinet secretary," the court said.
Copyright 1998 The Washington Post
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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: LINDSEY MUST TESTIFY
The Hotline
July 28, 1998
"Setting the stage for a Supreme Court confrontation," the U.S. Appeals Court ruled 2-1 against Pres.
Clinton's invocation of atty-client privilege to prevent the testimony of aide Bruce Lindsey. The court
said "it could be contrary to tradition, common understanding and our governmental system" to shield
Lindsey from appearing before the grand jury. The court wrote: "When an executive branch attorney
is called before a Federal grand jury to give evidence about alleged crimes within the executive branch,
reason and experience, duty and tradition dictates that the attorney shall provide that evidence. Their
duty is not to defend clients against criminal charges and it is not to protect wrongdoers from public
exposure." The White House has seven days to appeal. White House counsel Charles Ruff said that the
White House would decide after they have studied the ruling (Broder/Van Natta, New York Times,
7/28).
The White House could take the case either to the full federal Appeals Court or to the Supreme Court,
which had ordered the Appeals Court panel to hear the case on an expedited timetable. "But the (White
House's) prospects for success -- and for blocking testimony by (White House attorneys) during an
appeal -- appear dim." The opinion "stressed the different roles and responsibilities of government
lawyers and private attorneys." From the opinion: "With respect to investigations of federal criminal
offenses, and especially offenses committed by those in government, government attorneys stand in a far
different position from members of the private bar." The Appeals decision "went further than the initial
decision on the case" by Judge Norma Holloway Johnson, which ruled that a gov't atty-client privilege
exists but should be balanced against prosecutors' needs for information (Marcus, Washington Post,
7/28). CNN's Blitzer: "A major setback for President Clinton and his supporters" (CNN, 7/27). NBC's
Reid on a potential White House appeal: "(I)t is certainly more likely that this one will go to the Supreme
Court than the Secret Service, the Secret Service may appeal, but there's precious little chance they
would prevail there. Here, they have a better argument, so that this is something that really could delay
this investigation into the Fall" ("Big Show," 7/27).
WHITE HOUSE RESPONSE
White House Deputy Spokesman Barry Toiv, travelling with the President in New Mexico: "The
practical result of the Court's decision is that the President and all government officials will be less likely
to receive full and frank advice about their official obligations and duties from government attorneys.
Government officials and lawyers need to have frank and candid conversations. The attorney-client
privilege serves the public interest by fostering fully informed and more accurate decision making because
officials are more likely to seek legal advice and attorneys to provide that advice. Without the privilege,
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frank and candid exchange of information and advice will be chilled. After reviewing the opinion
thoroughly, we will decide whether to appeal" (Mult., 7/27).
HOW VALUABLE CAN LINDSEY BE?
NBC's Shipman: "As for Bruce Lindsey, the President's closest adviser who now may be forced to
testify after today's Appeals Court decision, sources say he maintains he has no incriminating evidence
against the President and, they add, the White House may appeal today's decision ... The change of heart
about the President's testimony, at least on his terms, say advisers, is an illustration of a new
understanding that both sides share; while the President may enjoy broad public support, the public also
wants an end to the crisis and would not at this point applaud a President who seems to be stalling"(7/27). CNN's King reported: "Bruce Lindsey is his closest friend, the President's troubleshooter in times
of trouble ... this hurts. The White House has long thought they could keep Bruce Lindsey out of the
Grand Jury" ("IP," CNN, 7/27).
Copyright 1998 American Political Network, Inc.
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COURT RULINGS AGAINST CLINTON SQUEEZE PRESIDENTIAL POWERS
The Christian Science Monitor
July 20, 1998
Francine Kiefer, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
The Clinton administration - more often than any other in modem history - has looked to the Supreme
Court to settle disputes over the powers and privileges of the presidency.
And with few exceptions, it has been disappointed with the high court's decisions, which are defining
the presidency in much more restrictive terms than the White House would like.
The result, say experts, is less political maneuvering room for Mr. Clinton - and less freedom to discuss
confidential matters. In practice, the court's decisions mean a shrinking of the president's inner circle of
confidants to "his spouse and people covered by existing clear privileges," says Mark Tushnet, a
Georgetown University law professor.
The latest setback for the White House came Friday, when the president's Secret Service agents were
forced to appear before special prosecutor Kenneth Starr's grand jury for the Monica Lewinsky case.
This, after Chief Justice William Rehnquist refused an administration request to temporarily block the
agents' testimony. The Justice Department had argued the agents enjoy a special privilege that exempts
them from testifying.
When Friday's development is added to other Supreme Court actions - such as last year's decision to
let the Paula Jones suit against Clinton proceed and this summer's striking down of presidential line-item
veto authority - the result is a buildup of "limits on the presidency," says political scientist James Thurber
of American University here.
While the high court played a key role in the Watergate scandals surrounding the Nixon presidency,
scholars say this administration has turned to the tribunal with unusual frequency.
One reason is that Clinton is under more attack, politically and legally. "In the modern era, political
controversy of all sorts has become even more legalized," says Mr. Tushnet.
While delaying tactics by the Clinton administration played a role in so many cases ending up before
the high court, scholars say serious issues are involved.
Presidential safety?
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The Justice Department, on behalf of the Secret Service, argues that the issue in its case is presidential
safety. If agents testify, the reasoning goes, it will break the confidentiality between agents and the
president. That breach could cause a president to keep agents at arms' length, endangering his life.
But every step along the judicial road has brought rejection for the administration in this case. Chief
Justice Rehnquist said the Justice Department had not shown that agents' testimony would cause
"irreparable harm" to the president. He added that while the court might still review the case, he didn't
see anything so far that would cause it to rule in the administration's favor.
Given this, the more likely venue for the administration to pursue its cause is in Congress, where there
is already some interest in granting the Secret Service greater privileges.
Attorney-client privilege
In tenor, Friday's decision on the Secret Service echoed an earlier ruling by a federal judge that Bruce
Lindsey, a legal adviser to the president, must also appear before the Starr grand jury.
The Lindsey ruling, though, represented a partial victory for the president: The judge accepted the
notion that the confidentiality of attorney-client privilege extends to the president and government-paid
attorneys. The judge also ruled that the first lady is protected by executive privilege.
But, the judge said, attorney-client privilege must be weighed against the prosecutor's needs for
information, and, in this case, those needs were greater than the president's. The White House says
attorney-client privilege is absolute and is appealing. A ruling is expected this month, which could yet
go to the high court.
Still, more important in terms of presidential power is the court's jettisoning of the line-item veto. "It
was a very powerful tool," says Thurber.
One area where analysts agree is that the court underestimated the consequences of allowing a civil
suit - the Paula Jones case - to proceed against a sitting president. The justices said a civil suit would not
be a distraction to the president.
Many experts now say it has been. "Obviously, the president isn't above the law," says Jeffrey Rosen
of George Washington University. "But what's generally lacking [from the court] is a deference to the
president."
Copyright 1998 The Christian Science Publishing Society
362
PRESIDENT'S BODYGUARDS ARE ORDERED TO TESTIFY
The Boston Globe
July 18, 1998
Brian McGrory, Globe Staff
The chiefjustice of the Supreme Court dealt a swift and potentially severe blow to the White House
yesterday, ruling that President Clinton's lead bodyguard and a battery of other Secret Service officers
must comply with a subpoena and testify before a federal grand jury.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist's written order was made public just four minutes before a noon
deadline. A few hours later, the independent counsel, Kenneth W Starr, whisked several Secret Service
officers before a grand jury in the US District Courthouse here, presumably to testify about allegations
that Clinton was involved in a sexual relationship with former White House intern Monica S. Lewinsky
and pressured her to lie about it.
The ruling means that for the first time, Secret Service agents are being forced to testify about the
president they are charged to protect. For Clinton, it also means that the guards with the most intimate
knowledge of his daily whereabouts, actions, and visitors are now compelled by law to share that
information with investigators.
Starr was in such a rush to secure the testimony that he ordered the agents to be present at the
courthouse by the noon deadline for Rehnquist's decision. With the ruling in hand, Starr decided not to
wait until his regular grand jury reconvenes Tuesday, but instead had two officers and a recently retired
officer testify before an unrelated grand jury, with the transcripts to be read before the usual panel next
week.
Larry Cockell, the lead plainclothes Secret Service agent in Clinton's protective detail, stood in a
hallway outside the grand jury room for several hours waiting to be called, but was never brought inside,
his lawyer said. Cockell is expected to be called back to the courthouse by Starr some time next week.
"He's a law enforcement official," John Kotelly, Cockell's attorney, said on the courthouse steps. "He
will tell the truth. There is no question about that."
Asked whether Cockell might provide testimony damaging to Clinton, Kotelly replied: "I'm afraid I
can't address that at all."
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For the second consecutive day, the pace and tone of the Lewinsky case rose to the level of grand legal
theater. Some White House aides expressed outrage that Starr seemed to be using Secret Service agents
as props in a storyline designed for play on newscasts across the nation.
"They didn't need to bring them up there for the high noon thing, then leave them out there in the
hallway all day," said one senior White House official, who talked on the condition of anonymity. "They
were using very professional people in an unprofessional manner."
In his decision, Rehnquist, the most senior member of the court, provided an exclamation point on the
sometimes bitter legal dispute between Starr and the Clinton administration over Secret Service
testimony. He decided to rule on the Clinton administration's request for a stay himself, rather than refer
it to the full court because "several of my colleagues are out of the country."
He supported the earlier rulings by US District Judge Norma Holloway Johnson and the full US Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia that Secret Service agents are not entitled to any privilege against
testifying because of their role as protectors of the president.
Johnson had ruled on May 22 that the agents must comply with the Starr subpoenas and testify. Her
position was upheld by a three-judge panel of the appellate court and again on Thursday by a unanimous
ruling of nine judges on the appeals court.
"A stay applicant must also show that there is likelihood that this court, having . . . heard the case,
would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals," Rehnquist wrote in his two-page decision. "The
applicant simply has not made that showing to my satisfaction, and I believe my view would be shared
by a majority of my colleagues. The opinion of the court of appeals seems to me cogent and correct."
Rehnquist said the Supreme Court would probably decide to hear arguments on the issue when it
reconvenes in October, though by that time all sides agreed it would be a moot issue for Clinton.
The Justice Department and the Treasury Department, which oversees the Secret Service, have argued
that agents should not be allowed to testify about the president they are charged to protect. By allowing
such testimony, those officials asserted, the court would be endangering the president, because Clinton
and future presidents would attempt to distance themselves from agents in pursuit of privacy, and in
doing so put themselves in harm's way.
Clinton again sought to distance himself from the argument. White House officials have repeatedly said
they have no political or legal stake in the Secret Service testimony, but rather the testimony should be
prevented for the principle of presidential safety.
"I have a legal opinion and I have a personal opinion, but I think it would be completely inappropriate
for me to be involved in this," Clinton said yesterday before Rehnquist issued his ruling.
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Clinton added: "These people risk their lives to protect me and other presidents in a professional way,
not a political way."
Legal analysts said Starr, through the Secret Service testimony, was probably trying to corroborate
information already developed from other witnesses and records, such as the number of times that
Lewinsky may have visited Clinton in the Oval Office.
"We can assume that Clinton secretary Betty Currie and other aides have already testified in great detail
about Ms. Lewinsky's appearances in the West Wing, whether she was ever alone in the Oval Office and
for how long," said Bruce Yannett, a former federal prosecutor and now a lawyer in New York. "The
Secret Service testimony will simply add to that level of detail."
Yannett unflatteringly described the strategy as "the Ken Starr-bull-in-the-china-shop approach - you
wreak havoc without regard to the consequences if it will reap you one tiny nugget of evidence."
Others said the victory represents a legal coup for Starr because of the quality of testimony that Secret
Service agents will probably provide, and their proximity to Clinton. They are trained, some said, to
assimilate the smallest details of the president's daily life.
"The Secret Service agents may be the best eyewitnesses because they are trained to be observant and
to note irregularities," said Jonathan Turley, a law professor at George Washington University.
Rehnquist: Testimony stay denied
Following is the text of yesterday's ruling by Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist, denying
a motion to prevent testimony by Secret Service agents:
This case is before me as circuit justice on the application for stay submitted by the solicitor general,
on behalf of the secretary of the treasury, Robert E. Rubin. Because several of my colleagues are out of
the country, I have decided to rule on the matter myself rather than refer it to the conference.
An applicant for stay first must show irreparable harm if a stay is denied. In my view, the applicant has
not demonstrated that denying a stay and enforcing the subpoenas pending a decision on certiorari would
cause irreparable harm. The secretary identifies two injuries that would result from denying a stay: any
privileged information would be lost forever and the important interests that the "protective function
privilege" protects would be destroyed. I cannot say that any harm caused by the interim enforcement
of the subpoenas will be irreparable. If the secretary's claim of privilege is eventually upheld, disclosure
of past events will not affect the president's relationship with his protectors in the future. On balance, the
equities do not favor granting a stay.
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An applicant for stay must also show that there is a likelihood that four members of this court will grant
certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals on the merits. This case is obviously not a run-of-
the-mine dispute, pitting as it does the prosecution's need for testimony before a grand jury against claims
involving the safety and protection of the president of the United States. I shall assume, without deciding,
that four members of this Court on that basis would grant certiorari.
But a stay applicant must also show that there is a likelihood that this court, having granted certiorari
and heard the case, would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. The applicant simply has not
made that showing to my satisfaction, and I believe my view would be shared by a majority of my
colleagues. The opinion of the court of appeals seems to me cogent and correct. The district court which
considered the matter was also of that view, and none of the nine judges of the court of appeals even
requested a vote on the applicant's suggestion for rehearing en banc.
The application for stay is accordingly denied.
Copyright 1998 Globe Newspaper Company
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APPEALS COURT ORDERS CLINTON GUARDS TO TESTIFY; SECRET SERVICE
AGENTS MUST TELL OBSERVATIONS OF PRESIDENT, LEWINSKY
The Baltimore Sun
July 8, 1998
Lyle Denniston, Sun National Staff
WASHINGTON -- A federal appeals court ordered two Secret Service officers yesterday to tell a
federal grand jury about their observations of President Clinton inside the White House, including
possible private encounters with Monica Lewinsky.
Rejecting the Secret Service's argument that forcing the officers to testify would put the president's life
at risk, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Washington gave a significant --
though perhaps only temporary -- victory to independent counsel Kenneth W Starr.
The Secret Service contends that if presidents knew that their protectors could be summoned to testify
in the future, the presidents would push the agents away, lessening the chances that the Secret Service
could keep a close protective envelope around the chief executive and his family.
The appeals court said it was upholding Starr's demand for the testimony of officers assigned to protect
the president. The Secret Service failed to show that a legal bar to such testimony was necessary to its
ability to effectively protect the president, the appeals court said.
It added: "The arguments of the Secret Service are based in large part on speculation -- thoughtful
speculation, but speculation nonetheless."
At the same time, the court set up a shortened schedule for the next step in the case that could speed
it on toward the Supreme Court for a final showdown. The Secret Service was given seven days --
compared with the usual 45 -- to ask the full appeals court to review the three-judge panel's ruling in
Starr's favor. After that, an appeal would go to the Supreme Court.
Starr has conceded that only the Supreme Court "has the moral authority and public credibility to issue
a final ruling on what the Secret Service plainly believes is a sensitive, life-or-death issue."
While further legal steps unfold, the two officers, along with a Secret Service lawyer who has debriefed
them about what they saw or heard while near the president, are unlikely to have to appear before the
grand jury in the Lewinsky matter.
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Starr, praising the appeals court for acting swiftly, said, "We trust the Secret Service will now join us
in helping the grand jury gather information that is relevant to this investigation. It is fundamental in our
country that all law enforcement officers cooperate fully in responding to requests for relevant
information in a federal grand jury investigation. The court of appeals today reaffirmed that bedrobk
principle."
The independent counsel has said that the Secret Service officers have "some of the most important
evidence" the grand jury is seeking in its investigation of whether Clinton lied when he denied under oath
having a sexual relationship with Lewinsky, and whether the president and others tried to persuade
Lewinsky to lie as well.
The prosecutor has said that the two officers, identified in court papers as Gary Byrne and Brian
Henderson, have together refused to answer 19 of the prosecutors' questions, and that the Secret
Service's chief counsel, John J. Kelleher, has refused to answer four questions about what Byrne and
Henderson told him.
Starr has not said publicly what he believes the officers saw, but he has said the information is "highly
relevant" to whether the president and others committed the crimes of perjury or obstruction ofjustice.
U.S. District Judge Norma Holloway Johnson refused in May to bar the officers' testimony. That was
the result the appeals court upheld yesterday. Though it ruled in Starr's favor, the appeals court did not
accept all of the legal arguments he had made.
The court said, for example, that it did not need to rule on Starr's claims that federal law compels the
Secret Service to share evidence of crime with the grand jury and that the courts had no power to create
a privilege against testimony by the Secret Service.
Nor did the appeals court embrace Starr's argument that presidents would never push away their
protectors unless the presidents had something to hide. Instead, the appeals court said that at a practical
level, the Secret Service had simply offered insufficient proof that the privilege it was seeking was closely
related to the president's physical safety.
While conceding that "the nation has a profound interest in the security of the president," the court
said, "the president knows that effective protection depends upon proximity to his protectors," making
it unlikely that he would push them away.
The court also questioned why the Secret Service needs protection against forced testimony, when it
does not require its officers or agents to sign promises of confidentiality about what they see and hear.
Moreover, the court noted, agents are not barred from telling their stories after they have left the Secret
Service.
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The court also said the protection against testimony would be of little value to the president, since
Clinton has insisted that the privilege would be the Secret Service's to claim, not his.
Copyright 1998 The Baltimore Sun Company
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ANTI-GAY ORDIANANCES AFTER ROMER
Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinatti, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati
By Darren Welch
The Supreme Court may chose to revisit the controversial topic of legislation outlawing protected
class status based on sexual orientation in the near future. The Court's ruling in Romer v. Evans hardly
ended the debate and the issue is back into the spotlight, thanks to Cincinnati's "Issue 3."
In November 1992, Colorado voters passed initiative ballot "Amendment 2," which was titled "No
Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation." In the 1996 decision Romer
v. Evans, the Supreme Court of the United States struck Amendment 2 as an equal protection violation
using rational basis analysis.
On November 2, 1993, local initiative ballot "Issue 3" was enacted by 62% of Cincinnati voters. The
amendment read:
NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION, CONDUCT OR RELATIONSHIPS.
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact, adopt,
enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which provides that
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship constitutes,
entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to have any claim of minority or
protected status, quota preference or other preferential treatment. This provision of the City
Charter shall in all respects be self-executing. Any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy
enacted before this amendment is adopted that violates the foregoing prohibition shall be null
and void and of no force or effect.
The Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund challenged the initiative but the Sixth Circuit ruled that
Issue 3 is constitutional. Celebrating his victory, Karl Kadon III, Cincinnati assistant solicitor general
who argued the case, said: "The whole case is about the right of people to decide what their government
can do. It's the notion of American Democracy."
The Supreme Court may sometime in the future decide to take this case and decided if Issue 3 is, like
Amendment 2, unconstitutional. Issue 3 is worded differently and is different in scope (it is local, as
opposed to statewide) than Amendment 2. The City of San Francisco and eight other cities are urging
the Supreme Court to hear the case. They argue that Issue 3 contravenes Romer and that the high court
should overturn the Sixth Circuit decision upholding Issue 3. The City of Cincinnati argues in return that
equal treatment is, by definition, not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection of the
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laws. If the Supreme Court affirms the Sixth Circuit's decision, it may spark a wave of Issue 3-like local
ordinances, similar to the state-wide ordinances voted on in the past before the Romer decision.
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CITY URGES NEW GAY RIGHTS FIGHT AT HIGH COURT
The Recorder
June 30, 1998
Rinat Fried
San Francisco has long led the way with gay-tolerant laws.
Now, the city is increasingly playing national cop on gay issues, working to knock other cities into
an equally enlightened stance. For the second time in three years, the S.F city attorney's office is heading
to Washington, D.C., to fight another city's anti-gay ordinance.
The offender is Cincinnati, which in 1993 amended its charter to adopt a law prohibiting city
government from extending "preferential treatment" to gays, lesbians, or bisexuals.
If the Cincinnati case sounds familiar, it should.
In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a similar Colorado law. San Francisco also filed an
amicus curiae brief in that case, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620.
San Francisco has rounded up support from eight other cities -- including Boston, Los Angeles and
Aspen, Colo. -- in asking the U.S. Supreme Court to invalidate the Cincinnati law in Equality Foundation
of Greater Cincinnati Inc. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289.
"Any time we see a law which repeals a city's gay ordinance and prohibits the addition of any future
ones we will be involved," says City Attorney Louise Renne.
In briefs filed with the Supreme Court last week, San Francisco city attorneys argued that Cincinnati's
law contravenes Romer and that the court should overturn the Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals,
which upheld the law.
"If a gay or lesbian were denied a library card, or denied a building permit, this law would pretty much
prohibit them from any kind of a redress from local government," says Deputy City Attorney Jayne Lee.
But Cincinnati says that San Francisco is firing in the wrong direction.
"Cincinnati is not a bad place," says Deputy City Solicitor Karl Kadon, who is defending the initiative.
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"What we are saying here is, is equal treatment not good enough?"
Kadon says that the Cincinnati law differs from the Colorado law in a crucial respect.
"What our charter amendment seeks to prohibit is not the claim of discrimination from being raised,
but from any preferential treatment being raised," he says.
But San Francisco city attorneys say Cincinnati has used minor differences in language to get around
the prohibition in Romer.
Copyright 1998, The Recorder
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GAY GROUPS ARE ANGRY AT SEXUAL PREFERENCE RULING
The National Law Journal
November 10, 1997
David E. Rovella, National Law Journal Staff Reporter
SECURE IN THEIR BELIEF that a 1996 U.S. Supreme Court ruling had squelched "no-preference"
laws that bar discrimination suits based on sexual orientation, gay rights groups were shocked by an Oct.
23 federal appellate decision upholding such a law in Cincinnati.
In declaring the law valid, the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished the Cincinnati City
Charter amendment, known as Issue 3, from Colorado's Amendment 2, which sought to add a no-
preference amendment to that state's constitution. The Colorado amendment was ruled unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court in the landmark case Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
Nonetheless, the three-judge 6th Circuit panel found that the Cincinnati law had a rational relationship
to legitimate community ends. The panel also said the law properly places gays on the same footing with
other individuals not receiving special constitutional protection. Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 94-3855.
Attorneys representing Cincinnati hailed the ruling as a valid distinction that did not run afoul of
Romer. "This isn't about gay rights," said Deputy Cincinnati Solicitor Karl P Kaddon III. "We argued
that [under] a rational-basis test, the matter of popular support for such a measure must be considered."
But gay rights groups call the 6th Circuit decision a "renegade ruling" that directly contradicts Romer.
"Every single anti-gay voter initiative of recent years has been rejected by courts and voters across the
country -- from Maine to Florida to Oregon and Idaho," said Suzanne B. Goldberg, a staff attorney with
the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, which represented plaintiff Equality Foundation of
Greater Cincinnati. "This decision exalts the 'right' to discriminate on the same day that the Senate holds
hearings about a federal measure to outlaw employment discrimination based on sexual orientation."
The Senate bill -- the Employee Non-Discrimination Act, or ENDA -- would bar employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation, raising the classification almost to the level of race and gender
protection under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Senate staffers say, however, that the bill is
unlikely to make it out of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources before Congress
adjourns for the year.
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The Cincinnati ruling, meanwhile, has raised the hackles of 6th Circuit observers. "This is the most
conservative panel that could have been put together," said constitutional law Prof. Melvyn R.
Durchslag, of Cleveland's Case Western Reserve University Law School. "There is absolutely no
distinction between the Cincinnati amendment and the Colorado initiative." The panel was composed
of two Reagan administration appointees, Judges Robert B. Krupansky and Alan E. Norris, and Carter
appointee Cornelia G. Kennedy.
The Cincinnati charter amendment was passed by popular vote in a Nov. 2, 1993, referendum. It bars
city agencies from enacting, adopting or enforcing any city law that allows sexual orientation to form
the basis for a claim of minority or protected status.
The law was originally struck down by a district court as unconstitutional, but the 6th Circuit reversed
that decision in a 1995 ruling. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court last year, the case was remanded
to the 6th Circuit for reconsideration in light of Romer.
Written by Senior Circuit Judge Robert B. Krupansky, the 24-page opinion distinguished the city
charter amendment from the Colorado law struck down in Romer by saying that a municipal charter
provision is more easily overcome by appeals to higher state levels. He added that the financial
considerations of avoiding increased litigation, as supported by the 62 percent of Cincinnati voters in
favor of the amendment, made the law rationally related to a legitimate government objective.
"The Cincinnati Charter Amendment [advances] a variety of valid community interests, including
enhanced associational liberty for its citizenry, conservation of public resources, and augmentation of
individual autonomy imbedded in personal conscience and morality," he wrote.
The judge added that the Colorado amendment was broader in scope than Cincinnati's, and thus more
susceptible to challenges. He concluded that while the Colorado law could be construed to bar
protection of homosexuals under laws of general application to all citizens, the Cincinnati amendment
merely placed gays on the same level as individuals who are not members of any protected class.
"The fact that this is a municipal statute does not distinguish its [susceptibility to challenge] from a
state statute," said Professor Durchslag. "That argument would insulate any municipal ordinance from
constitutional attack."
Though the 6th Circuit lifted the district court's injunction against enforcement of the charter
amendment, plaintiffs lawyers say they will seek an en banc rehearing.
Stiff Opposition
In his introductory remarks to the Senate, ENDA sponsor Sen. James M. Jeffords, R-Vt., offered his
bill as a way to "achieve [the] goal of equal rights for job opportunities, [but] not by creating any special
rights for gays and lesbians."
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Yet despite its sponsorship by Sen. Jeffords, the Senate Labor Committee chairman, the federal
nondiscrimination act still faces long odds. Opponents of the bill, such as the conservative American
Enterprise Institute and the National Legal Foundation, say that the act would lead to a "litigation
bonanza" that would balloon legal costs for American businesses.
"ENDA constitutes a major expansion of federal power in the workplace," said Mathew Staver,
president and general counsel for Liberty Counsel, a conservative lobbying group. "It would require the
federal government to declare [that] all sexual preferences are equal in validity and to abandon its
commitment to the traditions of marriage and family."
This ENDA differs substantially from its 1996 version, which failed 50-49 in the Senate. The current
legislation bars consent decrees that include quotas, disallows suits based on a denial of benefits to gay
partners and allows religious groups to deny employment on the basis of sexual orientation, except in
nonreligious jobs.
Copyright 1997 The New York Law Publishing Company
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APPEALS COURT UPHOLDS ANTI-GAY RIGHTS MEASURE, 1993 CINCINNATI
INITIATIVE RESTRICTS ACTIONS BY CITY
The Washington Post
October 24, 1997
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
A federal appeals court yesterday upheld a Cincinnati voter initiative that prohibited the city from
protecting gay people against discrimination.
The 1993 amendment to the Cincinnati city charter was similar to a Colorado law struck down by the
Supreme Court last year as violating the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. But the three-judge
panel of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals said the Cincinnati and Colorado measures differed, largely
because of the role and powers of the jurisdictions involved. The Cincinnati ruling, unless appealed,
would clear the way for the law to take effect after being held up in court since its passage.
The appeals court noted that Colorado had barred all its cities from writing laws to safeguard
homosexual rights, but that in Cincinnati, the voter initiative was purely local in scope. The court
described the measure as "designed in part to preserve community values and character" and said the
city's voters "had clear, actual, and direct individual and collective interests" in adopting the law.
The gay community and city officials reacted immediately to the ruling, the latest volley in an emerging
and closely watched area of gay rights law. The decision came on the same day that the Senate was
holding hearings in Washington on legislation that would bar job discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
The Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, which challenged the Cincinnati initiative, called the
6th Circuit decision a "renegade ruling." While the organization asserted that the appeals court was out
of step with courts nationwide that have invalidated such measures, legal director Beatrice Dohm said,
"The court's ruling is a strong reminder that lesbian and gay Americans are not protected against
discrimination in most parts of the country."
Karl Kadon III, the Cincinnati assistant solicitor who argued the case, Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, for the city, called it "a big win for us. The whole case is about the right of
people to decide what their government can do. It's the notion of American democracy; everything else
is wrapping around it."
When the Supreme Court struck down the Colorado law last year, it said the state had wrongly barred
homosexual advocates from trying to win passage of anti-bias laws, allowing all other groups to continue
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lobbying state and local officials for such protection. "A state cannot so deem a class of persons a
stranger to its laws," the majority said in Romer v. Evans.
After its ruling, the high court asked the 6th Circuit to reconsider its ruling upholding the Cincinnati
law in light of the Supreme Court decision.
The appeals court said yesterday, "Romer should not be construed to forbid local electorates the
authority, via initiative, to instruct their elected city council representatives to withhold special rights,privileges, and protections from homosexuals " The judges on the panel were Cornelia G. Kennedy,Alan E. Norris and Robert B. Krupansky, who wrote the opinion.
Adopted with 62 percent of the vote, Cincinnati's so-called Issue 3 said, "The city of Cincinnati andits various boards and commissions may not enact . . any ordinance which provides thathomosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship [offers] any claim of
minority or protected status, quota preference or other preferential treatment."
The measure was a counter response to earlier ordinances adopted in Cincinnati that included sexual
orientation among anti-discrimination classifications such as race, sex and religion in laws covering
employment, public housing and public accommodations.
Copyright 1997 The Washington Post
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THE FDA'S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE TOBACCO
By Darren Welch
Brown and Williamson is the lead case in the ongoing high-stakes battle between the Clinton
administration and Big Tobacco over the Food and Drug Administration's authority to regulate
cigarettes as nicotine delivery devices. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recently
ruled in favor of the tobacco companies and an appeal by the Clinton administration is likely.
In 1995, David Kessler, then FDA Commissioner, started the regulatory battle by asserting authority
to regulate how cigarettes were sold and marketed in an attempt to limit underage smoking. Last year,
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina ruled that the FDA could regulate
tobacco products as nicotine delivery devices, but that the FDA had no power to restrict tobacco
company advertising and marketing methods. Although the district court's ruling was seen primarily as
a victory for the FDA, both sides appealed the decision to the fourth circuit. Joining Brown and
Williamson in the appeal were Philip Morris Cos. Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., and Lorillard
Tobacco Co.
Due to the death of one of the judges hearing the appeal, oral arguments were reheard before the
fourth circuit on June 9, 1998 in Charleston, West Virgina. The FDA argued that nicotine is a drug and
cigarettes are drug delivery devices under the definition of "drug" and "device" in The Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, passed by Congress in 1938. The FDA argued this would give authority to
regulate the manufacture of cigarettes and the advertising and marketing of cigarettes. In response, the
Tobacco companies argued that the factual assertions of the FDA are wrong and that limiting cigarette
advertising impinges upon free speech and is in violation of the First Amendment. On August 14, 1998,
the Fourth Circuit, in a 2-1 split, overturned the District Court and ruled that the FDA lacked the power
to regulate cigarettes as drug delivery devices.
The power to regulate the multi-billion dollar tobacco industry would have serious repercussions for
both Big Tobacco and the FDA. Tobacco manufacturers stand to lose billions in lost sales if the FDA
could increase the price of cigarettes or ban them completely. Furthermore, a Supreme Court reversal
against the tobacco companies would weaken their bargaining position in proposed settlements with
individual states. On the other hand, the FDA could be open to liability for health problems caused by
cigarettes if it had the power to regulate cigarettes and still allowed the sale of cigarettes to continue
after having concluded that cigarettes are drug delivery devices. The high-stakes involved in the effort
to regulate cigarettes make this a hot issue that may prompt the Supreme Court to hear an appeal and
make a final decision on the FDA's power to regulate cigarette sales and marketing.
379
FDA LACKS POWER TO REGULATE TOBACCO: APPEALS-COURT RULING SHIFTS
DEBATE ON TEEN SMOKING TO A RELUCTANT CONGRESS
The Wall Street Journal
August 17, 1998
Milo Geyelin and Greg Hitt
Capping a string of legal victories for cigarette companies, a federal appeals court ruled that the Food
and Drug Administration doesn't have the authority to regulate tobacco.
The ruling, a sharp setback for antismoking forces and the Clinton administration, immediately thrust
the debate over teenage smoking back before a Congress skittish about the issue.
In a 2-1 decision Friday, the Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in Richmond, Va., overturned a
landmark lower-court ruling last year that had granted the FDA regulatory authority over the $45 billion
industry. The three-member panel found that the FDA lacked explicit authority from Congress to expand
its reach to include cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.
President Clinton promptly announced that the Justice Department will petition the full Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals to review the decision and said he remained "firmly committed" to the FDA's authority
to regulate tobacco.
Whatever the full appeals court decides, however, will certainly be appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, guaranteeing no quick resolution to the tobacco debate and bringing pressure back on Congress
to resolve it. To that end, Mr. Clinton on Friday also called on Congress to "act responsibly" and "enact
bipartisan, comprehensive tobacco legislation to confirm the FDA's authority and take this matter out
of the courtroom."
On Friday, Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz.), author of the comprehensive antitobacco legislation debated
by the Senate early this summer, said, "The appeals-court decision today makes it even more imperative
that Congress pass comprehensive legislation to address the problem of youth tobacco use and
addiction."
But Congress, which earlier this summer killed the antitobacco bill that would have given the FDA
jurisdiction over tobacco and would have imposed sharp restrictions on the marketing of cigarettes to
youths, is unlikely to heed calls for action now. The Republicans who control Congress, which is in
summer recess, have been hostile to FDA regulation in general and ambivalent about extending its
authority over tobacco. Furthermore, some Republican aides say, congressional leaders would be wary
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of wading into such a contentious legal issue until after all judicial appeals have been exhausted, which
could take many months.
Enthusiasm for passage of any kind of tobacco legislation this year has been in a virtual free fall since
the McCain bill died in June. House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R., Ga.) still talks of a possible House vote
on a pared-down bill designed to reduce teen smoking, but aides now play down that prospect. Some
leaders are reluctant to reopen the issue, particuularly after emotional debate over tobacco chewed up
a large chunk of the Senate's time earlier this year, and got nowhere.
As it is now, the tobacco industry has strengthened its bargaining position in Washington. Should
negotiations on any new federal legislation begin, the cigarette companies can now wrest more
concessions in exchange for submitting to FDA regulation voluntarily. "The industry now has some cards
to play," said David Adelman, a tobacco analyst at Morgan Stanley Dean Witter.
Because the ruling is under a stay while pending appeals, Friday's opinion will have no immediate effect
on the FDA's finding in 1995 that nicotine is a drug and its declaration that it has the authority to
regulate the manufacture of cigarettes as nicotine-delivery devices. That finding was immediately
challenged in federal court in Greensboro, N.C., where a federal judge issued a surprise ruling last year
upholding the agency's regulatory jurisdiction over tobacco but striking down proposed FDA marketing
restrictions, including bans on billboard advertising.
Despite the latest ruling, David Kessler, who spearheaded the FDA's effort to regulate tobacco when
he was commissioner, remains hopeful. "We always assumed this would go all the way up the court
system," he said. "There are many acts left in this play."
Last year, the tobacco industry agreed to accede to FDA regulation, albeit with several crucial caveats
limiting control of nicotine, as part of a proposed $368.5 billion settlement with plaintiffs' lawyers and
attorneys general for some two dozen states. In some respects, the terms of the deal went far beyond
what the FDA was requiring. It would have mandated black and white labels on the top front of cigarette
packs warning "Cigarettes Are Addictive" and "Cigarettes Cause Lung Cancer," imposed bans on
billboard and outdoor advertising, and required a nationwide licensing system for tobacco retailers so
the FDA could enforce the pact.
In return, the industry sought congressional immunity from class-action lawsuits, suits brought by the
attorneys general seeking to recover billions in publichealth costs linked to smoking, and punitive
damages for past wrongful conduct. But when Congress raised the price tag to $516 billion earlier this
summer and stripped the industry of its liability immunity, the industry walked away from the deal, and
Congress let it die. That left the question of FDA jurisdiction over tobacco up to the courts.
With Friday's ruling against the FDA, the architects of last year's deal attacked antismoking activists
who opposed it for over-reaching and Congress for its failure to seize the initiative. "Those who continue
to over-reach in Washington in search of the perfect settlement blew a chance to get one that was good
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enough," said Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore, who spearheaded last year's settlement talks
between the attorneys general and the tobacco industry.
Nevertheless, tobacco companies were muted in their response to the latest favorable ruling, instead
reiterating their commitment to a broad settlement along the lines agreed to last year. The companies
issued only a brief statement Friday, saying they are "pleased" with the ruling and remain "fully
committed to taking meaningful steps" to reducing underage smoking.
Friday's decision on the FDA will have little affect on settlement discussions between the industry and
three dozen states with Medicaid suits pending, said one attorney general involved. Federal regulation
of the tobacco industry is for Congress to negotiate, not the states, said Washington Attorney General
Christine Gregoire, who is leading the talks and whose state is next up for trial, in September.
Those state settlement talks are expected to resume later this month. And the attorneys general are
focusing on how much money they can wring from the industry and what marketing restrictions,
antismoking measures and public- health concessions the tobacco companies will accept. Attorneys
general from Mississippi, Florida, Texas and Minnesota have already reached settlements, valued at a
total of $36 billion, for their suits to recoup smoking-related health costs.
But such victories have been the exception lately, with favorable rulings for the tobacco industry
stacking up. Last week, a state appellate court in Florida court threw into question a $1 million verdict
against Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. in a suit brought by the family of a dead smoker, by finding
that the suit was tried in the wrong county. Last month, a federal judge in North Carolina ruled that the
Environmental Protection Agency erred when it declared in a 1993 report that secondhand cigarette
smoke caused as many as 3,000 cancer deaths a year among nonsmokers, a report that led hundreds of
local governments to enact bans on indoor smoking. Meanwhile, Indiana saw its suit to recover state
Medicaid costs connected to smoking tossed out completely.
And Friday's decision only reinforces that the industry has far stronger legal footing than a year ago.
"In general, this drives home the message that Big Tobacco continues to be a formidable and powerful
force that is far from being conquered, let alone regulated," said Connecticut Attorney General Richard
Blumenthal.
Along with Brown & Williamson, the tobacco companies in Friday's case were Philip Morris Cos.; R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., a unit of RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp.; and Lorillard Inc., a unit of Lowes Corp.
Ann Davis and Suein L. Hwang contributed to this article.
Copyright (c) 1998, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL" POLICY
Able, et al. v. Cohen
By Darren Welch
The "don't ask, don't tell" policy could find its way to the Supreme Court as more and more members
of the military are discharged for their homosexual orientation. The controversial Clinton
administration's compromise on the old ban on gays in the military has been upheld in lower courts but
critics question the need for the policy and its constitutionality. In June 1998 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit heard arguments on a challenge to the "don't ask, don't tell" policy in Able, et al.,
v. Cohen. This decision could provide the Supreme Court with an opportunity to rule on the
constitutionality of the administration's policy.
While campaigning for the Presidency in 1992, Bill Clinton stated that he favored a repeal of the
military's ban on homosexuals in the military. As a result of political pressures, President Clinton backed
away from his initial stance on completely repealing the ban and in 1994 implemented the "don't ask,
don't tell" policy is designed to prevent homosexual activity in the military but requires that recruiters
do not ask what one's sexual orientation is. The policy authorizes a serviceperson's discharge if that
person engages in homosexual conduct or is proven to have a propensity to do so (an open admission
of one's homosexuality creates a strong presumption that one is likely to engage in homosexual conduct).
In 1994, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen ordered several changes in the policy, including
guidelines that make it more difficult to initiated an investigation into one's homosexual tendencies, a
policy that investigates and punishes false accusations, and increased training to officers, investigators,
and attorneys on the policy.
In 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the militaries policy in Richenberg
v. Cohen. Richenberg sued the Air Force after being dishonorably discharged for admitting his
homosexuality to his commander. He argued that the policy violates his right to free speech and
encourages government discrimination. In 1993, the Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, ruled that there
is a rational basis for the "don't ask, don't tell" policy and validated decisions by the Navy and California
Army National Guard to expel two servicemen who admitted to being gay. The policy has been upheld
several other times in Federal court. Either way the second circuit decides Able, et al., v. Cohen, an
appeal to the Supreme Court is likely.
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PENTAGON ISSUES CHANGES TO POLICY ON GAYS;
MILITARY: ALTERATIONS TO 'DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL' RULES ARE CALLED
MINOR. BUT HOMOSEXUAL ACTIVISTS SAY THEY ARE AN ADMISSION OF
FLAWS IN THE SYSTEM.
Los Angeles Times
April 8, 1998
Paul Richter, Times Staff Writer
The Pentagon on Tuesday issued what it called minor changes in its "don't ask, don't tell" policy on
homosexuals in the military, but gay activists called the revisions an acknowledgment of the flaws of the
controversial 4-year-old system.
After a year's study by an internal group, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen ordered five changes
intended to ensure that the military hierarchy fully understands the complex system and to guarantee that
its implementation does not violate privacy or other rights.
The changes were contained in a Pentagon report that showed a steady increase in the number of
service members discharged for homosexuality since the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy was
implemented in 1994. The numbers rose from 617 in 1994, to 850 in 1996 and to 997 in 1997.
While insisting that the system works overall, Cohen acknowledged that some commanders "haven't
gotten the message."
The policy, worked out amid scalding controversy in the opening months of President Clinton's first
term, is designed to prohibit homosexual activity in the military while barring routine investigations in
hopes of protecting personnel who want to keep their sexual orientation to themselves.
But advocacy groups have complained that military commanders do not understand the policy and
overstep its limits on investigating alleged homosexual conduct in the ranks.
The new rules:
* Call for commanders to check first with higher authorities before beginning an investigation of a
service member's alleged homosexual activities.
* Require that military investigators, attorneys and commanders be given more training to ensure that
they understand the policy's purpose and nuances.
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* Call for guidelines to make clear that anyone who accuses another service member of homosexuality
simply to harass him or her may be investigated and punished for sexual harassment.
* Generally discourage pretrial agreements in which criminal defendants are offered more lenient
sentences in return for blowing the whistle on homosexuals in the ranks.
* Generally discourage authorities from investigating personnel who are seeking discharges because
they are gay. In some cases, commanders have launched such inquiries to determine whether those
seeking discharges are claiming homosexuality to avoid a dangerous deployment or to leave the service
and avoid repaying medical or law school tuition.
In a few such cases, Cohen's committee found, investigations of apparent bad faith are justified. But
for the most part, such investigations risk violating privacy rules and are not justified, it concluded.
"Basically, it's a firmer adherence to rules designed to protect people's privacy," said Kenneth H.
Bacon, the chief Pentagon spokesman.
The anti-harassment policy was intended to respond to complaints that men have accused women of
being lesbians after their advances were spurned. Officials said the rules are designed to make clear that
allegations of homosexuality intended to harass women are unacceptable, though they said they had
found few such cases.
Anyone who makes accusations of homosexuality to harass others may end up being investigated
themselves, Cohen said in an interview with National Public Radio.
According to gay advocates, the new rule regarding pretrial agreements grew out of their complaints
about an airman in Hawaii accused in 1996 of raping another man. The airman had his sentence reduced
in a pretrial agreement after he turned in the names of 17 service members who allegedly committed
consensual homosexual acts.
Cohen's study committee decided that, while such plea agreements do not violate Pentagon policy, they
are unwarranted because homosexual conduct cases do not warrant criminal prosecution. Thus, such
plea bargains are "inappropriate in most cases," the committee said in a 16-page report analyzing how
the military has carried out the "don't ask, don't tell" policy.
The committee found that authorities had violated the rules in three cases but provided no details on
the violations.
David M. Smith of the Human Rights Campaign, a gay-rights advocacy group, said that the new rules
represent the "modicum of something positive."
Copyright 1998 Times Mirror Company
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"DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL" POLICY ON GAYS IN MILITARY IS UPHELD
Chattanooga Free Press
October 6, 1997
Richard Carelli, Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON -- For the third time in a year, the Supreme Court today turned away a challenge to
the Clinton administration's "don't ask, don't tell" policy on homosexuals in the military.
The justices, without comment, refused to revive a lawsuit by Richard Richenberg Jr., a former Air
Force captain.
Richenberg said the policy violates his free-speech rights and fosters government "discrimination and
bigotry."
The policy states that members of, and applicants for, the military will not be asked or required to
reveal their sexual orientation.
Members of the military are discharged for homosexual conduct, and a service member's
acknowledgment of homosexuality creates a presumption that he or she is engaging in homosexual acts
or has a propensity or intent to do so, according to the policy.
To avoid being discharged, the acknowledged homosexual must prove he or she is not engaging in,
nor intends to engage in, any homosexual act while in the military.
Richenberg entered the Air Force in 1985. After he served in the Gulf War, he began training for
special service in Saudi Arabia. While in training, Richenberg disclosed his homosexuality to his
commanding officer.
The Air Force canceled his Saudi Arabian mission and reassigned him to Offutt Air Force Base in
Nebraska, where discharge proceedings were begun.
Richenberg was given an honorable discharge in 1995.
He sued the Air Force, but a federal trial judge and the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against
him.
"We find no constitutional infirmity in the ... military policy," a three-judge panel of the appeals court
ruled by a 2-1 vote last year.
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In the appeal acted on today, lawyers for Richenberg argued that the policy is based on prejudice.
"The real objective ... is to inhibit members from telling anyone that they are gay and to guard against
the negative reaction that might be engendered if anyone expressly discloses that he or she is
homosexual," they said.
The case is Richenberg vs. Cohen, 96-1648.
Copyright 1997 Chattanooga News-Free Press Company
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APPEALS COURT BACKS MILITARY POLICY, UPHOLDS DISCHARGE OF TWO GAY
MEN
Los Angeles Times
September 6, 1997
Henry Weinstein, Times Legal Affairs Writer
A sharply divided federal appeals court in San Francisco on Friday upheld the military's "don't ask,
don't tell" policy, marking another setback for advocates of gay rights in the nation's armed services.
In a 2-1 decision, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that there is a rational basis for the 1993
policy, which permits homosexuals to serve in the military as long as they do not announce their sexual
orientation. The court validated decisions by the Navy and the California Army National Guard to expel
two decorated servicemen who in 1995 voluntarily acknowledged that they were gay, even though there
was no evidence that they had engaged in homosexual conduct.
In earlier rulings in the cases, which were consolidated on appeal, a federal trial judge in Seattle had
upheld the policy, while a federal trial judge in San Francisco had ruled against it.
Friday's ruling marked the fourth time in the past year that a federal appeals court has upheld the
policy.
The federal policy calls for the discharge of any service member who "engages in, attempts to engage
in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts." A "homosexual act" is
defined as "any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same
sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires." Moreover, the policy expressly provides for the
discharge of any person who states that he or she is a homosexual unless the person rebuts the
presumption that he or she will probably engage in homosexual conduct.
Before 1993, there had been a ban on gays and lesbians serving in the U.S. armed forces. As a
presidential candidate, Bill Clinton said he supported the repeal of the ban. But shortly after his election,
the Pentagon and some members of Congress vociferously objected to an outright repeal and Clinton
came out with the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, which he called an "honorable compromise." Gay rights
organizations denounced the policy, and there has been considerable litigation over it.
Both Andrew Holmes, a first lieutenant in the California Army National Guard, and Richard P
Watson, a Navy lieutenant, challenged the constitutionality of the policy, maintaining that it violated their
rights to free speech and equal protection of the laws.
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Appellate Judges Charles Wiggins and Thomas Reavley rejected those arguments. They held that the
government had a rational basis for excluding people who engage in homosexual conduct from serving
in the military. The judges stressed that in adopting the policy, Congress had concluded that "military
life is fundamentally different from civilian life" and that the military could impose certain restrictions
that would not be acceptable in civilian society.
The two conservative judges also found that it was rational for the government to presume from
Watson's and Holmes' voluntary acknowledgments that they are gay "that they will likely engage in
homosexual conduct," even though no evidence was offered that they had engaged in such conduct.
On this point, the two judges said they agreed with rulings from three other federal circuit courts.
"Although Congress' assumption that declared homosexuals will engage in homosexual conduct is
imperfect, it is sufficiently rational to survive scrutiny," Wiggins wrote in the majority opinion.
In a biting dissent, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, perhaps the most liberal jurist on the 9th Circuit, blasted
the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, which he described as "somewhat schizoid," and the reasoning of the
majority. He said the policy, as applied in these cases, clearly violates the I st Amendment.
"It is evident to me that if homosexual status is not a bar to service, admitting to that status--the
statement that 'I am a homosexual'--cannot itself be a cause of discharge," Reinhardt wrote.
"There can be nothing wrong about admitting to a status that is proper, yet what is being punished in
the case before us is just that--the admission of a permissible status. Clearly therefore, it is not the status
that is being punished, it is the speech," Reinhardt added.
"The decision says Andy was discharged for 'conduct' even though all he did was tell his commanding
officer that he was a gay man. Andy was never accused of, there was never any testimony about, and
no one ever claimed he engaged in any 'homosexual conduct,' however you might define that,"
Thompson said.
Holmes left the service while the appeal was pending and is working as a technical writer in
Sacramento, Thompson said.
Watson's lawyer, Christopher J. Bakes, said he was very disappointed by the decision. "The thought
was that if any of the circuits was going to overturn this policy it would be the maverick 9th Circuit,"
said Bakes, whose client remains on active duty--by court order pending resolution of the case.
Copyright 1997 Times Mirror Company
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SCHOOL VOUCHERS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wisc. 1998)
By Troy R. Rackham
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress Shall make no laws
respecting an establishment of religion.. " In 1973, the Supreme Court held, in Committee ofPublic
Education v. Nyquist, that this very clause bars states from providing grants, partial tuition
reimbursement, tax deductions, and maintenance to private schools because this aid had the primary
effect of advancing religion. The Supreme Court may very well call this 25 year-old precedent into
question in the near future by deciding the constitutionality of school vouchers.
The most likely candidate to put the school voucher issue before the High Court is the Wisconsin
Supreme Court case, Jackson v. Benson. At issue in Jackson was whether the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program (MPCP), which allows lower income families to get taxpayer-funded vouchers to attend
any private school of their choice (parochial or secular), violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
By a 4-2 margin, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the voucher program against an establishment
clause attack waged by the Milwaukee teachers union and the American Civil Liberties Union. The court
applied the embattled Lemon test, named after Lemon v. Kurtzman where the test was first contrived.
The Lemon test maintains that a government program violates the establishment clause if it: (1) does
not have a secular purpose, (2) has the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3)
creates an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.
Applying the first prong of the Lemon test, the court found that the MiPCP's purpose is to provide
low-income children with an opportunity to attend private schools rather than attending the problem-
ridden Milwaukee public schools- a purpose which is clearly secular. Secondly, the court found that
the MPCP does not have the primary effect of advancing religion per se. The court reasoned that the
MPCP itself only provides a benefit to parents- not the religious schools. Granted, the parents may
choose to send their children to a parochial school, the court reasoned, but this decision is the parents
to make and is not made by the state in any sense. Therefore, the MPCP is neutral towards private
schools- religious or not- and does not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.
Finally, the court found that the MPCP does not create an excessive government entanglement with
religion because the program does not require the state to monitor or regulate religious schools in any
new way.
The school voucher movement arose out of discontent with the quality of public schooling offered
by various states. Proponents of school voucher programs argue that vouchers offer an opportunity to
low-income children to attend excellent schools. Moreover, vouchers provide for competition among
public and private schools, and thereby increase the overall quality of all schools. Opponents of voucher
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programs argue that vouchers are just a hollow hope for those who have lost faith in the public school
system. Rather than cut into the total funding for public education by allowing vouchers, opponents
argue, states ought to just take measures to strengthen the public schools.
Notwithstanding the policy arguments for or against school vouchers, the issue promises to present
an important opportunity before the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court chooses to hear Jackson v.
Benson, or some other similar case, the Supreme Court will have the chance to provide clarity to an area
of the law which is as clear as Virginia swamp water in the spring. Indeed, some of these articles suggest
that the plaintiffs in Jackson should not take the risk of appealing the case to the Supreme Court
because the Court is likely to affirm the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision and provide strong precedent
for the Constitutionality of religious-neutral state support of private education. Whatever the outcome
may be, be assured that parties interested in the Supreme Court's recent Establishment Clause
jurisprudence will be watching this case closely.
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SCHOOL CHOICE AND THE SUPREME COURT
The Wall Street Journal
June 15, 1998
By Clint Bolick*
With the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision last week upholding the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program- the first of five state supreme court decisions on school vouchers expected this year- the
focus on the legal battle over school choice begins the shift to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Coincidentally, the Wisconsin decision was rendered only days before the 25th anniversary of choice
opponents' last victory in the U.S. Supreme Court. Many changes in the interim portend a different
result next time: not only the court's jurisprudence on the First Amendment's religion clause, but also the
nature of school choice itself
In its 1973 ruling in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, the court
struck down New York state's "parochaid" program that provided grants, partial tuition reimbursement,
tax deductions and maintenance and repair aid directly to private schools. Most of the benefits accrued
to religious schools and their students.
The court ruled that the program had the "primary effect" of advancing religion because it singled out
private schools and their students for special benefits. Accordingly, the program violated the First
Amendment's core "neutrality" principle.
But the court left open the constitutionality of "some form of public assistance (such as scholarships)
made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the
institution benefited"-- such as the GI Bill, which recipients may use at religious or secular schools.
Since Nyquist, the court has sustained such "neutral" benefits in five cases:
* In 1983, it upheld Minnesota's state income-tax deductions for education expenses, the vast
majority of which were claimed for religious school tuition.
* In 1986, the court unanimously sustained a blind student's use of public funds to prepare for the
ministry at a divinity school.
* In 1993, it allowed an Arizona school district to provide an interpreter for a deaf student
attending a Catholic high school.
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* In 1995, it forbade the University of Virginia from excluding a religious publication from
receiving student-fee funding.
* A year ago, the court overturned prior precedents and allowed public school teachers to provide
Title I remedial instruction in religious schools.
As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor acknowledged last year in Agostini v. Felton, the court has
"significantly changed" its "understanding of the criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an
impermissible effect." Even direct aid, Justice O'Connor explained, is constitutional if it is "allocated on
the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both
religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis."
Not only do school-choice programs adhere to the principle of neutrality- which Justice Anthony
Kennedy describes as "central" to the court's recent religion-clause cases- they possess a second
attribute of constitutionality: Benefits to religious schools are indirect. As Wisconsin Supreme Court
Justice Donald Steinmetz observed, "not one cent flows from the state to a sectarian private school . .
except as a result of the necessary and intervening choices of individual parents."
But direct aid, in the form of a publicly funded interpreter, should be impermissible, opined Justice
Harry Blackmun in his 1993 Arizona dissent, "when government dispenses public funds to individuals
who employ them to finance private choices, it is difficult to argue that government is actually endorsing
religion."
The court need not overturn Nyquist in order to uphold programs like Milwaukee's. For school
choice has evolved from "parochaid" to child-aid. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program adds private
and religious schools to an existing array of public school options- charter schools, magnet schools and
interdistrict transfers. In each instance, the practical consequence is the same: State education funds
follow the parents' choice. This is the essence of neutrality.
School choice is an essential element of public education reform. In Milwaukee, it has boosted
academic achievement and graduation rates and goaded changes in public schools. As former
Milwaukee schools superintendent Howard Fuller has attested, inner-city public schools will not improve
until low- income families are given the power to exit.
The Supreme Court is likely to soon have several opportunities to remove the constitutional cloud
hanging over school choice. The expected Wisconsin appeal is one, similar choice programs await
resolution in the supreme courts of Vermont, Arizona, Ohio and Maine.
In Brown v. Board of Education, the court declared that education "is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms." By sustaining school choice, the Supreme Court would take a giant
stride toward fulfilling that sacred promise.
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*- Mr. Bolick is litigation director at the Institute for Justice in Washington, D.C. and defended the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program.
Copyright @91998 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
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WISCONSIN WINS SCHOOL VOUCHER CASE; STATE RULING,
ALLOWING TAX MONEY FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION, COULD BE TEST CASE
The Washington Post
June 11, 1998
By Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer*
The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled yesterday that taxpayer money can be used to send poor children
to religious schools, clearing the way for a broad expansion of the nation's largest and most closely
watched school choice program.
Under the initiative, about 1,500 Milwaukee students now attend private schools using state-funded
vouchers, but until yesterday's ruling they were restricted to non-religious institutions. The court's
decision would allow as many as 15,000 Milwaukee children, or 15
percent of the total student enrollment, to leave public schools for private ones.
The decision marks an important victory for advocates of vouchers, who have suffered a string of
recent losses, both in the courts and Congress. But opponents- including Milwaukee's teachers union
and the American Civil Liberties Union- have vowed to appeal. And the case could become the first
test of the constitutionality of vouchers at the U.S. Supreme Court.
Wisconsin's highest court said that using taxpayer-funded vouchers to pay for religious school
educations violates neither the state's constitution nor the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
barring laws that promote religion.
Based on the idea that poor parents should have the same choices as more affluent families, the
groundbreaking program provides vouchers of about $5,000 to any child in a family whose income is
near the poverty level. With each student who transfers out of the Milwaukee public school system, the
state cuts the system's budget by about $5,000.
"This is not only going to allow for choice, but for competition among schools, public and private,"
said Gov. Tommy G. Thompson (R), who spurred the legislature to adopt the voucher program in 1990
and pressed for the 1995 expansion to include religious schools.
The Supreme Court has never specifically taken up a voucher case, and it has been 25 years since the
justices looked at tuition reimbursement for religious schools- striking down a New York policy that
reimbursed low-income parents. Since then the high court bench has grown more conservative and, in
several narrow votes, has allowed some state involvement with religious schools. The Wisconsin
program, however, goes further than disputes that have already passed the high court's muster.
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News of yesterday's ruling quickly circulated among Milwaukee parents, many of whom began
reconsidering their options for the fall.
"I'm pretty much in a state of shock," said Valerie Johnson, who has sent her three youngest children
to Milwaukee Catholic schools and was trying to determine yesterday whether she could get the voucher
money for next fall's session. Johnson, a part-time library aide whose
husband drives a garbage truck, said her children receive some money through a private foundation, but
"it's a struggle to pay the half that I have to pay."
School officials said those who meet the income requirements would be able to apply immediately
for the voucher money. But educators also expressed concerns about the potential loss of more than
$70 million to the city's public schools, and warned that political pressure to expand the program could
intensify as struggling middle-class families start to complain that the state is paying for some children's
private school educations but not others.
"I am warning state taxpayers now. They better hang on to their wallets," said Wisconsin schools
superintendent John T. Benson, a longtime opponent of school choice programs.
The families and advocacy groups who filed suit to block the program contend not only that it will
drain taxpayer money from already besieged public schools but will breach the First Amendment's
separation of church and state. Some invoked the images of children at Roman Catholic schools,
studying under crucifixes and learning about Mass as well as math.
"Religious schools are extensions of their churches," said Barry W Lynn, executive director of
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, which helped lead a years-long battle against the
voucher program. The challengers to the initiative also include a coalition of Milwaukee parents, People
for the American Way and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
The local teachers union, which had also joined the case, lamented both what it called a serious
erosion of church-state separation and the diversion of public school resources.
"This is not a long-range answer," added Bob Chanin, general counsel of the National Education
Association in Washington. "We think this comes at a time when that money is sorely needed in the
public schools and could be used to make necessary improvements."
In its 4-2 ruling yesterday, the Wisconsin court interpreted past U.S. Supreme Court cases to find
that the state's voucher program is a "neutral" effort to help parents pay for education. The court said
because the state gave poor parents money to attend sectarian or non-sectarian schools alike, it was not
trying to advance religion.
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"[N]ot one cent flows from the state to a sectarian private school except as a result of the
necessary and intervening choices of individual parents," Judge Donald W Steinmetz wrote for the
court.
Clint Bolick, with the Institute for Justice, said yesterday's ruling will embolden groups like his that
are working nationally to promote private school vouchers. "All eyes have been on Milwaukee. [The
ruling] is a major psychic boost to the school choice movement."
Cleveland has the country's only other taxpayer-funded voucher program allowing public funds for
religious schools. But a state appeals court blocked the program from expanding beyond its current level
of 2,000 on the grounds that it is unconstitutional.
*- Staff writers Linda Perlstein and Devon Spurgeon contributed to this report.
Copyright 0 1998 The Washington Post.
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BREACHING THE CHURCH-STATE WALL
The New York Times
June 12, 1998
Section A; Page 20; Column 1; Editorial Desk
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision upholding the use of public funds for parochial school
tuition strikes at the very heart of the constitutionally mandated separation of church and state that has
served American society so well. Although a few recent United States Supreme Court decisions have
relaxed strictures against using public money to support certain activities in parochial schools, those
cases have dealt with tangential and very limited benefits to the church-sponsored institutions. No
appellate court, including the Supreme Court, has ever allowed the huge transfer of taxpayer money that
the Wisconsin voucher program will put into parochial school coffers.
The voucher plan allows up to 15,000 low-income students in Milwaukee to attend private or
parochial schools with tuition paid fully by the state. Currently, only 1,500 students have used the
vouchers to attend private, nonsectarian schools. The program's growth depends on enrolling thousands
of students in parochial schools. Under the funding plan, the state will pay the parochial schools the full
cost of instruction for each voucher-bearing student or $4,700, the amount the state currently spends
on each student in the Milwaukee public school system. For each student who transfers out, the public
schools lose $4,700. The potential loss to the Milwaukee public schools could reach $70 million a year.
The state court argues that the voucher program, by giving students the choice of a private or
parochial school, is religion-neutral. But this veneer of choice does not change the fact that taxpayer
dollars would flow into sectarian institutions in contravention of the First Amendment prohibition against
the establishment of religion. Many church schools that would be tax-funded have religious
indoctrination as a core purpose.
The Wisconsin court's narrow analysis is naive on several levels. It fails to recognize the desire of
many voucher proponents to add religious content to public education. It also fails to foresee the
patronage bonanza that would result among politicians competing to funnel tax revenues to the
institutions favored by their constituents, whether they be urban Catholics in Northern cities or suburban
Protestants in the Sun Belt.
The Wisconsin decision, if upheld by the United States Supreme Court, would have a devastating
impact on public education nationwide. Many states will follow the Wisconsin example, given the power
of the religious lobbies. Parents will essentially be left to choose between a state-supported private
education system and the old public school system. As more families opt out of the public schools, those
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schools will starve. The downward spiral is easy to map. The question now is whether the United States
Supreme Court will have the wisdom to see that vouchers attack not only constitutional principles but
the common schools that are essential institutions for a democratic society.
Copyright @1998 by The New York Times Company.
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THE NATION: CHURCH, STATE AND SCHOOL
SQUEEZING THROUGH THE HOLES IN THE WALL OF SEPARATION
The New York Times
June 28, 1998
Section 4; Page 3; Column I
By Ethan Bronner
AFTER a substitute teacher in a Bronx public school led 11-year-old pupils in prayer and asked them
to accept Jesus Christ as their savior, the New York City Board of Education dismissed her this month.
In the words of the board's spokeswoman, the teacher "had very clearly crossed the line."
Who could argue? If the separation of church and state mandated by the First Amendment means
anything, surely it bars state-paid teachers from evangelizing to public schoolchildren in state-provided
classrooms during school hours.
Yet the fired teacher, Mildred Rosario, has become a minor hero to some. Parents, Mayor Rudolph
W. Giuliani and even the Republican Congressional leadership have complained that, at a time when
public schools are littered with needles and condoms, to fire a teacher for leading prayers is
incomprehensible.
The episode is an apt reminder that 36 years after the Supreme Court banned school prayer, there is
no consensus on the appropriate links between government and religion, particularly within the school
system.
Two days after Ms. Rosario's prayer, another storm over church, state and schoolhouse erupted after
a decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. It ruled that Milwaukee could spend taxpayer money to
send pupils to religious schools through a voucher system.
Wall of Separation
Civil liberties advocates and teacher unions expressed shock that the court would permit state
financing of institutions devoted to religious teaching.
But government aid to religious instruction has existed throughout American history. Through most
of the 19th century, public schools routinely taught the Bible. And even in this century, when the wall
of separation became commonly invoked, religious schoools have received substantial state subsidies.
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Since 1947, when the Supreme Court permitted New Jersey to reimburse parochial school parents
for the use of public school buses, large amounts of government money have gone to church-sponsored
institutions. Not only are church properties tax-exempt- no small matter in places like Manhattan-- but
parochial school parents in some states get tax breaks for tuition, and the equivalent of public vouchers
are widely used in church preschools and colleges. Churches and their schools have, of course, always
benefitted from state-financed police and fire protection.
The devil has been in the details.
Parochial schools may use state-provided buses for transportation to classes but not for field trips;
state-paid nurses may work at the schools but state-paid guidance counselors may not; the state may lend
parochial schools textbooks but not audio-visual aids or maps (a distinction that led Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan to quip that the next big challenge would be atlases, which are books of maps). For
years, public remedial teachers could serve parochial students only in trailers, a decision that the High
Court reversed last year, thereby permitting the state teachers to enter the schools.
Religious display rulings have been even more tortured. A city may erect a creche at Christmas or
a menorah at Hanukkah on condition that it is surrounded by enough other seasonal symbols, like
reindeer or plastic candy canes, to blunt its religious message.
As bizarre as some of these distinctions may sound, they emerged from numerous cases over half a
century. Most rulings came from divided courts and each established a slightly different set of criteria
for interpreting the First Amendment's command that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof "
Given the founders' history- they were running from regimes that imposed religion- it is no accident
that religious freedom leads the list of rights Congress is forbidden to abridge, or that on its heels come
speech and assembly. But the three form a nexus of individual liberty that is exceedingly difficult to
disentangle. Shifting criteria reflect shifting legal and political climates as well as shifting Supreme Court
personnel.
For example, it was Justice Hugo L. Black who wrote the 5-to-4 opinion in 1947 permitting New
Jersey to reimburse parents for sending their children to parochial schools on public transportation. He
said the First Amendment "requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and nonbelievers." He added: "It does not require the state to be their adversary. State power
is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them."
No Maps, Please
Twenty years later, in a case from New York State, Justice Byron R. White wrote a 6-to-3 decision
permitting the state to lend textbooks to parochial schools, saying the books were secular and would not
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be used for religious instruction. But Justice Black, whose broad interpretation of the First Amendment
had helped Justice White craft that decision, dissented, saying there was a distinction between aid for
things like transportation and lunch, which were nonsubstantive, and textbooks, which could be related
to religious views.
And even though textbook loans were permitted, a decision in the 1970's barred the lending of
instructional materials, including maps, to parochial schools "because of the predominantly religious
character of the schools."
In 1985, the Court barred public school teachers from performing remedial work in parochial schools.
Among the dissenters was Justice William H. Rehnquist, the future Chief Justice, who was instrumental
in the 1997 ruling overturning that decision.
The back-and-forth on these questions suggests that if the Wisconsin voucher decision is accepted
for review by the Supreme Court, something both sides say they want, the chances of a clear ruling seem
small. Four other states have similar cases pending and voucher systems are rapidly spreading across the
country.
Unfair Advantage
Apart from the fear that such programs would denude the public schools of motivated pupils and
much-needed cash, the concern of those opposed to the voucher program has been that if government
is seen to endorse one religion, that religion has an unfair advantage over others.
The founders actually banned government endorsement largely for a different reason. They feared
state involvement would sully religion, not help it.
Justice Black relied on that view when he wrote that the First Amendment "rested on the belief that
a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion." He added
that the history of established religion "showed that many people lost their respect for any religion that
had relied upon the support of government to spread its faith."
Advocates for a lowered wall of separation invoke the founders frequently, saying they never planned
for government to be a force for atheism. That is true, but the founders insisted on religious freedom,
mindful of something else: the danger of sectarian battle.
It is true that there appears little risk of a return to the religious wars of an earlier era. But a
contemporary version- a battle between religious and secular forces for control of public and
educational life- does not seem out of the question.
Copyright @ 1998 by The New York Times Company.
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS
Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326 (4' Cir. June 30, 1998)
By Troy R. Rackham
It has been 25 years since the Supreme Court announced its decision in Roe v. Wade. That decision,
perhaps more than any other in recent times, has significantly altered both the face of politics and law.
Abortion politics now play a major role in any national (or even statewide) election, in the creation of
national party platforms, and, of course, in the selection of the federal judiciary. The popular movement
to ban partial-birth abortions both in state legislatures and in Congress creates a new twist to this old
issue. The concern with such bans is whether they are constitutional under Roe v. Wade and its progeny.
Legislation banning late-term abortions is popular. Twenty-Eight states have adopted legislation
proscribing partial-birth abortions, and many more have considered adopting similar legislation. Despite
this popularity, such legislation remains in effect, at least in part, in only 1 1 of those states. This is
primarily because laws banning partial-birth abortions in sixteen states have been blocked by federal
courts. Only one federal court has upheld state legislation banning partial-birth abortions- the Fourth
Circuit in Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore.
Richmond Medical Center for Women concerns an injunction issued by federal district Judge Robert
E. Payne of the Eastern District of Virginia preventing enforcement of Virginia's partial-birth abortion
law. Virginia's law, passed in the General Assembly with overwhelming support, mirrors the law passed
by Congress and vetoed by President Clinton in 1997. Judge Payne held that the law was so vague and
loosely worded that it was not clear which procedures the law even banned. Virginia's law is so broad,
Judge Payne wrote, that even state medical officials are not sure what the law banned. Judge Payne
found that the law could be interpreted to ban all abortions, something which is clearly unconstitutional
under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. Therefore, Judge Payne concluded that it was appropriate
to issue an injunction preventing the enforcement of the partial-birth abortion ban until a full trial on the
merits could be heard.
Utilizing a procedural law which allows a litigant to appeal a district court judge's decision to a court
of appeals judge on an emergency basis, the attorney general for Virginia appealed Judge Payne's
decision to Circuit Court Judge Michael Luttig. Judge Luttig reversed Judge Payne, and found that the
Virginia law could in no way be interpreted to proscribe all abortions. In an 18-page opinion, Judge
Luttig concluded that Virginia's law banning partial-birth abortions clearly did not ban all types of
abortions, just those procedures specifically defined by the law (a definition approved by the American
Medical Association). Therefore, Judge Luttig wrote, Judge Payne's conclusion that the law was overly
broad was "simply in error."
Judge Luttig's decision varies from other federal courts' jurisprudence in this area. Indeed, the three
other federal courts who have heard this very same issue all have blocked enforcement of the partial-birth
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abortion bans. Two of those cases concerned laws passed by Florida and Iowa. In the third case, the
Seventh Circuit enjoined enforcement of Wisconsin's partial-birth abortion ban. This decision was
appealed to the Supreme Court and the Court recently denied certiorari in the case.
Advocates for abortion rights likely will appeal Judge Luttig's decision to a three-judge panel of the
Fourth Circuit, to the full circuit, and then maybe even to the Supreme Court. The litigants in the Florida
and Iowa case are also likely to appeal. Although federal court litigation of the partial-birth abortion ban
issue is still in its early stages, this issue is likely headed to the Supreme Court. As previously mentioned,
there is already a circuit split on the issue, and there is no indication that this circuit split will be resolved
any time soon.
The partial-birth abortion question presents two very important issues in before the Supreme Court:
federalism and abortion. To begin with, this case promises to present the issue of federalism squarely
upon the Court's threshold. After all, the regulation of medical procedures (including abortion) is a
power reserved almost exclusively for the states. Moreover, criminalizing certain types of conduct (like
performing or receiving a partial-birth abortion) is also an area reserved for the states. Therefore, a
decision upholding partial-birth abortion bans is also a decision voting in favor of states' rights.
On the other hand, the issue presents the tumultuous issue of abortion before the Court. The Court's
fractured opinion in Casey suggests that there may not be enough votes on the Court to overrule Roe.
At the same time, there are probably enough votes to further scale back the reach of Roe. Moreover,
the Court's recent federalism bent, as demonstrated by the Court's opinions in Lopez and Printz, suggests
that it may give presumption to the states' right to regulate and criminalize what it wants,
notwithstanding Roe and Casey.
Of course all of this is speculation. It remains to be seen whether this issue will reach the court. If
it does, the composition of the Court may have changed such that it may be clear which direction a
majority of the Court will go. Whatever the future holds, those interested in abortion- whether pro-
choice, pro-life, or something else- will surely be watching the litigation on this issue closely because
the ramifications are large.
404
THREE JUDGE PANEL REQUESTED TO ACT
The Richmond Times Dispatch
July 8, 1998
By Pamela Stallsmith, Times-Dispatch Staff Writer
The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy wants a three-judge panel to reinstate an order that
would block a new law banning partial-birth abortions from taking effect while a challenge to the law
is being heard in federal court.
In the latest turn of the labyrinthine case, the center yesterday asked that three judges from the 4th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals stop an order issued last week by one of their colleagues, Judge Michael
Luttig of McLean.
Luttig, widely regarded as a conservative junist on what's considered the country's most conservative
federal appeals court, overturned a preliminary injunction issued five days before by U.S. District Judge
Robert E. Payne that halted the law's enactment while a lawsuit is pending. That case goes before Payne
Aug. 18.
Two physicians and four medical clinics, which the center represents, are challenging the
constitutionality of the new law. They contend it is so broadly written that it could outlaw abortion
altogether.
Virginia is the only state in the nation where a judge has overturned a decision to block the law from
going into effect. More than half of the states have passed some sort of ban on partial birth abortions,
but courts in 17 states have stopped the law, according to the center.
"The resounding message from courts across the country is that so-called 'partial-birth abortion' laws
violate women's fundamental constitutional rights," said Simon Heller, a lawyer with the New York-
based center.
Attorney General Mark L. Earley's office, which is defending Gov. Jim Gilmore and the other
defendants, called the center's request "merely another legal maneuver intended to thwart the will of the
people of Virginia and their elected representatives."
Earley, a Republican, stood by Luttig's decision as "well-reasoned and legally sound."
Last week, after Judge Payne refused to lift his ruling, the attorney general's office specifically asked
Luttig to hear the matter as a single circuit judge. His ruling allowed the law to go into effect as
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originally intended on July 1. Luttig helped out abortion foes last June when he issued a last-minute
ruling that al- lowed a law requiring parental notification concerning abortion to be enacted. That law
is also being challenged.
The clerk of the court will appoint a randomly selected panel from among the court's 11 judges.
Luttig could be chosen to serve on the panel that will reconsider his decision, since the judge who's
already been involved in the case is not excluded from the selection.
Copyright # 1998 The Richmond Times Dispatch.
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JUDGE BACKS VIRGINIA LIMIT ON ABORTIONS
The New York Times
July 2, 1998
Section A; Page 12; Column 6; National Desk
By Michael Janofsky
For the first time, a Federal appellate court judge has upheld a state law restricting a form of late-term
abortion, a ruling that conflicts with findings by other Federal judges that struck down similar laws in
two other states.
In a decision on Tuesday night upholding a Virginia law enacted in April barring a late-term
procedure that opponents call partial-birth abortion, Judge J. Michael Luttig of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Richmond, reversed a Federal district judge, whose finding that the
law was unconstitutional was consistent with recent appellate court decisions in Ohio and Wisconsin.
The district judge, Robert E. Payne, had issued an injunction against the law last Thursday, pending
the start of a trial on Aug. 18.
Judge Luttig's ruling was hailed by lawyers for the state as well as by people active in the anti-
abortion movement who have made abortions in the last trimester of pregnancy a cornerstone of their
effort and draw moderates to their side.
Lawyers for the plaintiffs in the case said today that they were considering whether to appeal Judge
Luttig's decision to a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit, to the full circuit or to the Supreme Court.
In arguments before Judge Luttig, the plaintiffs contended that the Virginia law, which is comparable
to measures passed in other states and is modeled after legislation twice passed by Congress and twice
vetoed by President Clinton, is written so broadly that a majority of abortions could be banned.
"Judge Luttig has become the only appeals court judge in America to decide the bill's language is
clear, not vague," said Karen Raschke, a lawyer for plaintiffs in the case, including two doctors, two
clinics and three Planned Parenthood branches.
"One hundred percent of the previous court decisions found the language to be vague," Ms. Raschke
added. "He is a rogue judge on this."
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Simon Heller, a lawyer for the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, a nonprofit group in New
York that is also representing the plaintiffs, said that as a result of Judge Luttig's ruling, women seeking
abortions in Virginia and their doctors would not know whether they might be subject to prosecution.
Legislation outlawing late-term abortion has been adopted in 28 states since 1995 but remains in
effect in only 8- Indiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah and
now Virginia. Three other states- Alabama, Georgia and Nebraska- have limited enforcement. Kansas
has passed a law banning the procedure, but has not yet put it into effect.
Legislation that would ban late-term abortions in 16 other states have been blocked by Federal or
local courts. That includes a ruling today by a Federal judge in Louisville, Ky., who said he would
prevent a Kentucky law from taking effect on July 15 until he could hear debate on it next month.
In two of the three cases that have reached an appellate court- Wisconsin and Ohio- a three-judge
panel ruled against the state. In the Wisconsin case, the appellate court reversed a lower court decision
to uphold the ban, and the same court is now reviewing a case involving Illinois's law. In the Ohio case,
the United States Supreme Court let stand an appellate court decision that struck down Ohio's law.
The Virginia case came before Judge Luttig after Judge Payne refused the state's request on Monday
to reconsider his decision. With the law scheduled to go into effect today, the Virginia Attorney General
used a procedure that allows a case to be heard on an emergency basis before one judge, rather than
three.
Federal rules allow the loser in a court decision to choose any judge in the same state as the Federal
District Court. In choosing Judge Luttig, the defendants gave the case to a conservative judge who was
appointed to the Federal bench in 1991.
In his 18-page ruling, Judge Luttig disputed the plaintiffs' contention that the state law would expose
doctors to prosecution for the routine abortions they perform. That assumption, he wrote, "was simply
in error."
He also said that the lower court found "ambiguity where none reasonably exists" and that no
"persons of ordinary intelligence" would conclude that the law prohibits the kinds of abortions that are
constitutionally protected by Supreme Court decisions.
Copyright @ 1998 by The New York Times Company.
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APPEALS JUDGE LETS VA. LIMIT LATE ABORTIONS;
INJUNCTION OVERTURNED; STATUTE GOES INTO EFFECT
The Washington Post
July 01, 1998, Pg. AO1
By Spencer S. Hsu*, Washington Post Staff Writer
A federal appeals judge late Tuesday cleared the way for Virginia to begin enforcing a ban on late-
term, "partial-birth" abortions today, reversing a lower court that had delayed the law after determining
that it was too vague and likely unconstitutional.
The ruling by 4th U.S. Court of Appeals Judge J. Michael Luttig at 14 minutes before midnight
preserved, for now at least, a law that has been championed by antiabortion activists. Last year, Luttig
issued a similar ruling in support of another Virginia law that requires teenagers to notify their parents
before having an abortion.
Luttig's ruling- which abortion-rights advocates said would be appealed to either a panel of the 4th
Circuit Court or the U.S. Supreme Court as soon as today- puts the conservative federal circuit in
conflict with courts in all 17 other states where bans on the late-term procedure have been challenged.
Those include Florida and Iowa, where federal courts enjoined bans that were to have taken effect
Tuesday and today, respectively; and Wisconsin, where last week a three-judge panel of the 7th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals blocked state officials from enforcing a similar ban. Eleven other states have
similar laws in force.
Luttig's order reversed a ruling by U.S. District Judge Robert E. Payne, who last week barred
enforcement of Virginia's ban on abortions in which a fetus is partially delivered into the birth canal
before being destroyed. Payne, who will oversee a full trial on the issue next month, said the law passed
last winter by the General Assembly was so vaguely worded that even state medical officials weren't sure
what it really banned.
Payne contended that the law could be interpreted as a ban on abortions of all types, including
constitutionally protected procedures commonly performed during the first six months of pregnancy.
But Luttig disagreed. In his 18-page opinion, he observed that the Virginia statute mirrors legislation
passed by Congress and vetoed by President Clinton in 1997 The "undisputed purpose" of both
measures, Luttig said, is to bar any procedure in which a physician delivers a fetus, ruptures its skull and
dislodges it from a woman's body, a method that Virginia clinics challenging the ban say they do not use.
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"The plain language [of the law] cannot reasonably be read to prohibit the particular procedures that
plaintiffs actually do perform," Luttig wrote. "Therefore, the District Court's conclusion that the plaintiffs
faced a reasonable fear of prosecution 
. . was simply in error."
Abortion-rights groups quickly denounced Luttig for practicing "conservative activism" from the
bench.
"This is a conflict between Judge Luttig and virtually every judge who has looked at this issue," said
Simon Heller, attorney for the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy of New York City, a plaintiff
in the case.
"Conservative judges as much as liberal judges can be extremely activist, and this is an extremely
activist step to take," Heller said. He noted that Luttig's ruling does not mention Roe v. Wade, thelandmark 1973 Supreme Court ruling that guaranteed a woman's right to have an abortion, and does not
address the Virginia law's lack of a clause guaranteeing a right to abortion if a woman's health is at risk.
"Any abortion restriction that does not have an exception for a woman's health is
unconstitutional," Heller said. "The Supreme Court has said that over and over again."
Attorneys for the state countered that the ruling is an indication that the law is on solid legal ground.
"We are obviously pleased by the 4th Circuit's decision," Deputy Attorney General William H. Hurd
said early this morning. "It is now July 1, and partial-birth abortions are illegal in Virginia. This is good
news indeed. As the opinion of the 4th Circuit confirms, the law does not apply to the conventional
abortion procedures that concerned the plaintiffs."
In a statement released before the judge's opinion, Virginia Attorney General Mark L. Earley (R)
attacked Payne's ruling.
"We have the governor, the attorney general . all Virginia officials telling the federal court whatthe state statute means," Earley spokesman David Botkins said. "The U.S. Supreme Court has said thefederal courts must accept a state's reasonable interpretation of its own laws when constitutionality is
at issue."
In March, the nation's high court sidestepped the first opportunity to hear arguments on a "partial-birth" abortion ban, letting stand without comment another federal appeals court ruling that struck down
an Ohio ban.
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Exactly one year ago, Luttig played a similar role in another abortion fight in Virginia, striking down
an injunction issued by a U.S. district judge in Roanoke against a Virginia restriction on teen abortions.
That law, which requires girls 17 and under to notify a parent before obtaining an abortion, remains
in effect while the case is pending before the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals.
State lawyers, then as now, exercised a local rule permitting appellants in an emergency to skip a
three-judge circuit panel and instead choose a single judge residing in the same state as the district court.
Luttig, an appointee of President George Bush who lives in McLean and is a leading conservative on the
court, was selected both times, although plaintiffs moved in vain Tuesday to have a panel hear the state's
appeal.
Virginia's statute, passed last winter and signed by Gov. James S. Gilmore III (R), bans an abortion
in which a doctor "deliberately and intentionally delivers a living fetus or substantial portion thereof' to
kill the fetus.
Physicians convicted of the first-class misdemeanor would face up to 12 months in jail and a $2,500
fine.
In his injunction, Payne wrote that "the term 'partial-birth abortion' is a term coined by legislators,
antiabortion activists and the media. It has no accepted medical meaning."
He said the new statute would alter "well-settled Virginia law," citing testimony by the state's own
medical expert witness that indicated the measure could apply to the two most common first- and
second-trimester abortion procedures.
But Luttig said Payne's ruling found "ambiguity where none exists."
"The District Court all but presumed the statute unconstitutional in the face of the governor's,
the attorney general's and the prosecutor defendant's sworn representations" otherwise, Luttig wrote.
Earley, a former missionary who once was the personal lawyer to former Christian Coalition director
Ralph Reed, has said the ban will end a practice of "killing infants" in the process of being born.
In filings Tuesday, Deputy Attorney General Hurd wrote that the Constitution included no protection
for the specific late-term procedure Virginia was outlawing.
"The District Court erred by considering the abortion right articulated in Roe v. Wade to include
lethal procedures performed on children in the state of being born," he said.
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*- Staff writer Donald P. Baker contributed to this report.
Copyright 1998 by The Washington Post.
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THE VITALITY OF R.F.R.A. AS APPLIED TO FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854 (8 ' Cir. 1998)
By Troy R. Rackham
In 1990, the Supreme Court struck a blow at religious liberty in Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, by holding that laws burdening religious exercise do not violate the free exercise clause of the
First Amendment so long as the laws are neutral and generally applicable. This decision, read broadly,
would allow the free exercise rights of individuals in unpopular faiths to be trampled upon by
government regulations. Because of the enormous ramifications of such an interpretation, many different
religious and other groups joined forces in order to convince Congress to override the Smith decision.
Congress quickly responded, passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) with almost
unanimous support. RFRA was designed to force the government, both state and federal, to have a
compelling interest before imposing any regulation burdening any religious exercise.
In its first decision interpreting RFRA, City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, the Supreme Court
held that Congress did not have the power to enact RFRA. More importantly, the Supreme Court
concluded that Congress violated the strict separation of powers imposed by the structure of our
constitutional scheme by enacting legislation which, in effect, tells the Court that the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution was wrong. While the Court's decision clearly maintains that RFRA
is invalid as it applies to regulations or laws imposed by the states, the question still left open is whether
the Court effectively killed RFRA altogether.
In Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, a divided panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals recently addressed this question in the context of bankruptcy. This panel concluded that RFRA
still applies to federal questions, like bankruptcy, because the separation of powers analysis in Boerne,
which killed RFRA as it applied to the states, does not apply to Congressional action relative to federal
issues. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Articel I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to limit
its own laws, like bankruptcy, even if such limits require the federal government to have a compelling
interest before burdening religious exercise.
Specifically, Christians relates to a turnover motion brought by a bankruptcy trustee against Crystal
Evangelical Free Church. The trustee demanded that the church turnover the $13,450 given to it as
tithing by the Young family, who subsequently declared bankruptcy. Initially, the district court found
in favor of the trustee, concluding that RFRA immunizes tithing, a religious exercise, from bankruptcy
proceedings. The Supreme Court subsequently handed down the Boerne decision. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court summarily remanded the appeal in Christians back to the Eighth Circuit for a
reconsideration of the decision in light of Boerne. Upon reconsideration, the Eighth Circuit affirmed its
initial opinion. The Eighth Circuit found that Boerne only struck down RFRA as it applies state laws,
and not as it applies to federal laws.
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If the Supreme Court hears this case, it may open a door that most commentators thought had been
closed and locked. If the Court reverses the Eighth Circuit, it will provide a final answer to some
lingering doubts about the vitality of RFRA after Boerne. However, if the Court affirms the Eighth
Circuit, it may breathe life back into an intensely popular piece of legislation. What is more, an
affirmance of the Eighth Circuit may help to ease the tensions between Congress and the Courts which
have been growing ever so slightly since Boerne. It will indeed be interesting to see what direction the
Court takes with respect to this case, if it takes any action at all.
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FREE EXERCISE GIVES COURTS A WORKOUT: APPEALS PANEL PROTECTS
BANKRUPTS' TITHES AND RESURRECTS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT
ABA Journal
July, 1998
84 A.B.A.J. 18
By Steve France
It is a commonplace for judges to remind litigants that courts merely interpret the law and thus cannot
act like legislatures. But the opposite scenario- when Congress usurps a judicial function- is so
uncommon that some courts hardly have the vocabulary to respond.
A still-smoking example of such feuding between the two branches involves Congress' legislative
response to what it saw as an abdication by the Supreme Court in 1990 of its duty to uphold freedom
of religion under the First Amendment.
Three years after the Court adopted a new, less protective test for evaluating claims of infringement
of religious liberty, Congress stepped into the breach with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The
law says government may not burden a person's religion unless it can demonstrate a compelling interest
for doing so.
Last year, the Court counterpunched in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, ruling that RFRA
exceeds Congress' power and contradicts principles of separation of powers. Not a single justice
defended the law. The decision upheld a local historic-district ordinance used to bar a church from
expanding its building.
So much for RFRA, most people concluded. But not the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals based in
St. Louis.
Reviewing its own prior ruling in light of City of Boerne, a divided panel held on April 13 that the
statute still applies to federal programs and laws, in this case the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Christians v.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church, No. 93-2267.
The split on the appellate panel mirrors a split in the lower courts and among scholars and civil
libertarians. RFRA supporters say City of Boerne held that Congress cannot make state governments
grant more protection to religion than required by the First Amendment, but did not decide the issue in
the federal sphere.
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RFRA critics say Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's opinion in City of Boerne left no doubt that the
Court rejected the law in its entirety as an unprecedented power grab by Congress.
The majority in Christians ruled that Congress has the power to limit its own laws to provide greater
religious accommodation, as long as the limitation does not establish religion.
Giving Is Good
In so ruling, the court quashed a bankruptcy trustee's seizure of $13,000 in tithes contributed by a
couple to their New Hope, Minn., church before declaring bankruptcy.
The trustee had argued that the tithes constituted fraudulent transfers under federal bankruptcy law
because they purchased nothing of value.
The trustee's action was found to burden the couple's religious freedom.
Under the 1990 Supreme Court case that spurred Congress to adopt RFRA, Employment Division
v. Smith, the trustee could have recovered tithes that were ruled to be fraudulent transfers because the
law is neutral and is aimed at any gifts made prior to bankruptcy, as opposed to being aimed at religion.
But RFRA bars government from burdening a person's religion unless it can demonstrate that the
action is the least-restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.
That strict test is what Congress believed the law to be before the Supreme Court ruled in Smith in
1990.
The statute was "designed to perform a constitutional function," admits University of Texas law
professor Douglas Laycock. A First Amendment expert, he helped draft the law and has been at the
center of the resulting constitutional tug-of-war, representing the churches in both City of Boerne and
Christians.
RFRA's critics insist that the law "invaded the province of the Judicial Branch," as Judge Andrew
Bogue wrote in dissent from the Christians decision. While Congress can legislate specific exemptions
to accommodate religion in certain situations, RFRA impermissibly "grafted onto every federal law" a
general free exercise right different from that determined by the Court, he wrote.
The statute was a "serious breach of the separation of powers doctrine," said Bogue, a district judge
sitting by designation on the 8th Circuit panel.
Judicial Growling
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Even RFRA's supporters admit that Justice Kennedy's opinion in City of Boerne contains language
similar to Judge Bogue's. Laycock writes it off as judges merely "growling and protecting their turf." All
the separation of powers talk in the Supreme Court opinion "relates to congressional power to use the
14th Amendment to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states," he says, and does not affect Congress'
ability to restrict itself
Other supporters, including the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, an alliance of about 60
religious and civil rights groups, have been working in Congress and state legislatures to rehabilitate
RFRA. At the top of their agenda is a bill sponsored by U.S. Sen. Charles Grassley, R-lowa, to amend
the Bankruptcy Code to shield tithes- and similar contributions to secular causes- from the reach of
bankruptcy trustees. The bill has passed Congress and was awaiting the president's signature.
Meanwhile, bankruptcy trustees outside the 8th Circuit continue to pursue tithes as fraudulent
transfers. Laycock says there are a "dismaying number of decisions" in bankruptcy courts and other
venues finding that City of Boerne struck down RFRA in its entirety.
Steve McFarland of the Christian Legal Society, and a leader of the RFRA lobbying coalition,
acknowledges there is language in City of Boerne that if "read out of context can sound like [the justices]
are trying to reassert their sover-eignty over judicial interpretation." But, he insists that "if the Court
really meant to bury RFRA, they would have said so."
The Clinton administration is on the side of RFRA supporters, sticking to a policy that the statute still
applies in the federal context.
The lawyer who successfully argued against Laycock and RFRA in City of Boerne, Cardozo Law
School professor Marci Hamilton, says RFRA is clearly dead. In her analysis, the opinion is just the latest
in a line of decisions "building fences around congressional power" in the last 10 years, with the Court
insisting that every enactment be linked to an enumerated power.
She wrote in a February article in the law review of the College of William & Mary about the
astonishing scope of RFRA, that "its application to every law. precludes straight-faced arguments that
it could have been grounded in any specific enumerated power.
"If Congress is going to enact a law regulating religious liberty, then it cannot act in this . . abstract,
across-the-board manner." An example of a constitutional law focusing on concrete solutions might be
Sen. Grassley's proposal to limit the power of bankruptcy trustees.
If the justices wanted to preserve RFRA in the federal sphere, they would have said so, Hamilton
says. The Court's fundamental concern was to uphold the separation of powers in the face of an
attempted "hostile takeover" by Congress of the free exercise clause "at the behest of and for the purpose
of serving organized religion."
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Is RFRA so unprecedented that it will give rise to a new judicial limit on congressional power? If not,
Hamilton fears, the First Amendment will become irrelevant in the federal sphere and in states where
legislatures are moving to enact their own RFRAS.
Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard's law school sees little chance of seismic shifts in the
constitutional balance.
He concludes it would be "unbelievably irresponsible" and contrary to separation of powers principles
for the Court to translate its irritation with Congress over RFRA into a constitutional doctrine.
Copyright OAmerican Bar Association, 1998.
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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT IS ALIVE
The National Law Journal
April 27, 1998, Monday; Pg. A8
By Frank Jossi*
Citing the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, or RFRA, the 8th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled April 13 that a Minneapolis-St. Paul area church can, after all, keep $13,450 donated
to it by a couple who later declared bankruptcy.
The case- Julia A. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church- began when Bruce and Nancy
Young tithed their income to New Hope Congregation from February 1991 to February 1992. After
the Youngs filed for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, in February 1992, a bankruptcy trustee asked the church
to return the money so that the Young's creditors might be reimbursed.
The appellate court already had sided with the church in an opinion issued May 1996, according to
Kenneth Corey-Edstrom, of Minneapolis' Henningson & Snoxell, the church's attorney in the matter.
But now, in the wake of a key U.S. Supreme Court ruling, he said, the judges have "said RFRA is still
alive."
The Supreme Court had sent the Minnesota bankruptcy case back to the 8th Circuit last year after
ruling on City of Boerne v. Flores, Archbishop of San Antonio. In that case, a church in Texas had
argued that RFRA allowed it to disregard state preservation laws when expanding a church in a historic
district. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that RFRA does not extend to state laws and that the
act violates Article 5 of the 14th Amendment.
But the 8th Circuit distinguished Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church by noting that
bankruptcy is a federal issue and concluding that the case is therefore subject to RFRA. Moreover, the
court said, asking the couple to return the money "substantially" infringed upon their right of religious
expression.
Fred Morrison, a professor of constitutional law at the University of Minnesota, says the Supreme
Court's decision last year made a crucial distinction between what RFRA covers and what it does not.
In essence, the decision in the Texas case forbids RFRA from being applied to state and local laws but
requires "a high level of scrutiny in cases where the free exercise of the right to practice religion" may
be invoked in federal cases.
Congress last year introduced laws in both houses to prohibit seizure by creditors of money donated
to charities and churches by debtors, but neither bill has moved forward yet.
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Meanwhile, Dick Thomson, an attorney for the bankruptcy trustee in the Minnesota case, said he
believes the 8th Circuit misread the law, and he will consider appealing to the Supreme Court.
*- Compiled from National Law Journal staff, correspondent and Associated Press reports.
Copyright 1998 New York Law Publishing, Inc.
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THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT AND LOPEZ:
Did Congress Usurp Its Power Under the Commerce Clause?
By Troy R. Rackham
In United States v. Lopez (1995), the Supreme Court altered the last fifty years of commerce clause
jurisprudence by striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act as a usurpation of Congress' power.
Prior to Lopez, the Supreme Court was so deferential to Congressional action under the commerce
clause that even regulating a single wheat-farmer in Ohio was considered constitutional so long as the
aggregate result of such regulation had a "substantial effect" upon interstate commerce. Wickard v.
Filburn (1942). Lopez, however, sent shockwaves throughout the legal world because a majority of the
Court indicated that it was no longer willing to just rubber-stamp Congressional legislation which only
has a tangential relation to interstate commerce. Instead, the Court indicated that it was going to require
stricter adherence to the interstate commerce power enumerated in Article I of the Constitution by
requiring a stronger relation between the legislation and commerce. The recent 4h Circuit opinion,
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997) r hng en banc
granted, Feb. 05, 1998, promises to test whether the Lopez case was just an aberration or whether the
Court is serious about scaling back Congress' commerce power.
On the night of September 21, 1994, Christy Brzonkala and a friend met two Virginia Tech football
players, Antonio Morrison and James Crawford. About fifteen minutes after meeting these two men,
Brzonkala was violently gang raped by both Morrison and Crawford. Afraid and embarrassed,
Brzonkala never reported this rape to the police out of fear of retaliation. Brzonkala was so traumatized
that she changed her appearance, cut off all her hair, attempted suicide, and eventually dropped out of
her classes. Seven months later, Brzonkala finally reported the rape to Virginia Tech pursuant to the
University's "Policies for Student Life."
Virginia Tech then held a hearing on the matter. After the hearing, the committee acquitted
Crawford, but found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for a year. Morrison appealed
this decision, and another hearing was held because Morrison was charged under the wrong policy
during the first hearing. The second committee only found Morrison guilty of "abusive conduct," but
still suspended him for a year. Morrison appealed this sentence to the Provost arguing that the sanction
imposed was overly harsh. The Provost overturned Morrison's sentence and instead "deferred" the
suspension until Morrison graduates.
Brzonkala then brought suit against Virginia Tech alleging that the University violated Title IX in its
handling of her complaints. Additionally, Brzonkala sued Morrison and Crawford under the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), alleging that she was brutally gang raped because of gender animus. The
district court, Judge Kiser, dismissed the VAWA claims against Morrison and Crawford, finding that
VAWA was unconstitutional because Congress usurped its commerce clause power. Judge Kiser
reasoned that, under Lopez, Congress must demonstrate that rape has a substantial affect upon interstate
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commerce, and not just a tangential or tenuous relationship to commerce. Judge Kiser found that rape
does not have such a relationship to interstate commerce, and therefore Congress' did not have the
enumerated authority to enact VAWA.
Brzonkala appealed this decision to a panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The panel, by
a 2-1 vote, reversed the district court and found that Congress did have the power to enact VAWA.
This panel reasoned that Lopez simply requires Congress to demonstrate that its legislation enacted
under the commerce clause has a substantial affect upon interstate commerce. In this case, Congress
spent four years in committee making findings as to the relationship between rape and interstate
commerce. In this case, the panel argued, Congress inserted voluminous findings into the record
indicating that rape has a substantial affect upon interstate commerce. This should be enough to satisfy
Lopez according to the panel. The case has been reheard en banc by the entire Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. An opinion is expected in the next few months.
The Brzonkala case may present a grand opportunity before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
may use Brzonkala as a platform to demonstrate to Congress that it is serious about scaling back the
substantial deference previously given to Congress relative to the commerce clause. Moreover, the
Court might use the Brzonkala case to strengthen its Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. After all,
penalizing rape has almost exclusively been the province of the states. Indeed, domestic matters like rape
are central to the state's police power. Therefore, the Court may strike down the VAWA because it
interferes with a province traditionally reserved to the states.
Of course, all of this is speculation. The Court may never hear Brzonkala or any other case
questioning the Constitutionality of VAWA. The Court may still give a great deal of deference to
Congress' actions under the commerce clause, notwithstanding Lopez. However, most Supreme Court
watchers will keep their eyes on this case because of the possible ramifications it could have both on
Congress and the Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.
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CIVIL RIGHTS LAW WITHSTANDS EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL TEST
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
Volume 144, No. 27
February 9, 1998
By Margo L Ely
While the overwhelming majority of the country has chosen to withhold judgment on the issue, the
onslaught of criticism of feminist groups for their failure to rally around Monica Lewinsky is typical.
Undoubtedly, no matter what position would be staked out as the feminist position, harsh criticism
would be forthcoming. The expectation that all women's rights advocates should voice the same opinion
is a transparent technique to create the appearance of divisiveness.
As public opinion of President Clinton's job performance continues to climb, feminists also have
reason to render approval- on the strictly professional performance level. Bill Clinton has appointed
more women to his cabinet and more female federal judges than any other president. From Attorney
General Janet Reno to Secretary of State Madeline Albright and, of course, Supreme Court Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Clinton's female appointments have not only been well qualified but excellent role
models- in spite of who appointed them.
Likewise, the Clinton administration has passed, and vetoed, legislation in a concerted effort to
protect and expand women's rights. For example, the Violence Against Women Act has been in effect
since 1994. With the abundance of court opinions restricting the viability of women's discrimination
claims, the VAWA provides an additional remedy for women to pursue. This month's column reviews
the first federal appeals court decision upholding the constitutionality of the VAWA. In a local case,
U.S. District Judge George M. Marovich also upheld the constitutionality of the VAWA and sent the
matter for interlocutory appeal to the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Anisimov v. Lake, 1997 WL
538718 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
In Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1997 WL 785529 (Dec. 23), the
4th Circuit held that the VAWA is constitutional as a proper exercise of Congress' powers pursuant to
the commerce clause. The case arose in the fall of 1994 when Christy Brzonkala, a freshman at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute, was gang-raped, according to the appeals court. The court set forth the events
that led to Brzonkala's civil action attacking the school for being too lenient in disciplining her attackers:
On the evening of Sept. 21, 1994, Brzonkala and a friend met two Virginia Tech football players,
Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, in a dormitory room. After about 15 minutes, Brzonkala's
friend and Crawford left the room, and Morrison wanted to have sex with Brzonkala. Brzonkala
twice said no before Morrison stopped her from leaving the room by throwing her on a bed. He then
raped her, and before Brzonkala could recover, Crawford came into the room and exchanged places
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with Morrison. Crawford then raped Brzonkala. When Crawford was finished, Morrison raped
Brzonkala again and said, "You better not have any ... diseases." In the months after the rapes,
Morrison said publicly that he liked to "get girls drunk and [have sex with] them."
Brzonkala became depressed and withdrawn, cut off her long hair, stopped attending classes and
attempted suicide. Eventually Brzonkala received a retroactive withdrawal from Virginia Tech. It was
not until April 1995 that Brzonkala filed a complaint against Crawford and Morrison under Virginia
Tech's sexual-assault policy. After she filed the complaint, she heard that Crawford said he should have
"killed the bitch." Neither Brzonkala nor Virginia Tech reported the rapes to the police. Rape is the
only violent felony that Virginia Tech authorities do not automatically report to the police.
In May 1995, Virginia Tech held a hearing on Brzonkala's complaint, which lasted three hours and
was taped. During the testimony, Morrison admitted that despite the fact that Brzonkala had told him
no twice, he had sex with her. Crawford denied that he had sex with Brzonkala but confirmed that
Morrison had.
After the hearing, the Virginia Tech judicial committee found insufficient evidence against Crawford,
but found Morrison guilty of sexual assault. The university immediately suspended Morrison for two
semesters and informed Brzonkala of its action. Morrison appealed the sanction to the dean of students
based on due process grounds, but the appeal was rejected. According to Virginia Tech's rules, the
dean's decision was final.
In the beginning of July, the dean of students and another university official drove four hours to
Brzonkala's home and advised her that Morrison had hired an attorney and was threatening to sue the
school for violations of due process. A rehearing, which they referred to as a "mere technicality,"
therefore was required. The second hearing convened late that month and lasted more than twice as long
as the first proceeding. Brzonkala was required to provide her own legal counsel for the hearing. The
university informed Brzonkala, allegedly without sufficient notice, that the testimony from the first
hearing would not be admissible at the second hearing. She thus had no time to either gather affidavits
or produce live testimony from her witnesses. Morrison's attorney, on the other hand, received advance
notice and was able to produce such evidence. In addition, Morrison's attorney was granted complete
and early access to the tapes from the first hearing, while Brzonkala's lawyer was not.
After the second hearing, Morrison again was found guilty and suspended for two semesters.
Brzonkala received notice of this action. On appeal, however, the university's senior vice president and
provost overturned the sanction, finding it was excessive, and they deferred the suspension until
Morrison's graduation. This time, however, Brzonkala did not receive notice of the university's action;
she learned Morrison would be returning to campus when she read an article in the Washington Post.
Morrison returned in the fall of 1995, his full athletic scholarship intact. In November 1995, another
newspaper article indicated that after the second hearing, the judicial committee had found Morrison
guilty of the reduced charge of "using abusive language," rather than sexual assault.
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On Dec. 27, 1995, Brzonkala filed a federal lawsuit against Morrison, Crawford and Virginia Tech,
claiming violations of Title IX, as well as the VAWA. The district judge dismissed the Title IX claims
and ruled the VAWA unconstitutional. The 4th Circuit reversed.
The VAWA is a comprehensive federal statute designed to address the escalating problems of
violence against women and creates a civil rights cause of action for gender-motivated crimes. Before
enacting the VAWA, Congress conducted four years of hearings, creating a vast amount of legislative
history on the act. The congressional findings provide a wealth of statistics on violence against women.
For example, every week in 1991, more than 2,000 women were raped and more than 90 women were
murdered- 9 out of 10 by men. U.S. women are at least three times more likely to become rape victims
than their European counterparts, and three out of four American women will be victims of violent crime
sometime during their lives.
With respect to how violence against women affects the national economy and interstate commerce,
Congress made the following findings:
* Domestic violence alone costs employers an estimated $3 billion to $5 billion annually due to
absenteeism.
* Almost 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or are forced to quit in the aftermath of the
cnme.
* Fear of gender-based violence deters women from taking jobs in certain areas or at certain hours
that pose a significant risk of such violence.
* Fear of gender-motivated violence deters women from using public transportation.
The act creates a federal right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender and provides
a civil cause of action against a person "who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender." A crime
of violence is "an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony" under state or federal law. Proof
of gender motivation under the VAWA should proceed in the same way that gender or race
discrimination is proved under other civil rights laws. The act provides that the victim may recover
compensatory and punitive damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief against the liable party.
The constitutionality of the act was challenged on appeal based on the commerce clause. Pursuant
to the clause, Congress may regulate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. The standard
to uphold a law as a proper exercise of Congress' power under the commerce clause is a low one indeed.
The court need only determine "whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity"
substantially affects interstate commerce. The 4th Circuit readily answered this question in the
affirmative.
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Based on the voluminous congressional findings, the court concluded there was indeed a rational
basis for the position that violence against women substantially affects interstate commerce. "After four
years of hearings and consideration of voluminous testimonial, statistical and documentary evidence,
Congress made an unequivocal and persuasive finding that violence against women substantially affects
interstate commerce."
This case illustrates an instance where all groups, not just feminists, should speak out with one voice.
The procedures Virginia Tech used reflect an unseemly ambivalence toward the rights and dignity of
women. Congress was fully apprised of the devastating effects violence against women have on not only
women but the nation. The foresight used to usher through the VAWA- and the 4th Circuit's validation
of a woman's civil rights against such heinous crimes- should receive high approval ratings.
Copyright 0 1998 by Law Bulleting Publishing Company.
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RAPE AS "COMMERCE" CONSTITUTES A REACH
The Tampa Tribune
January 1, 1997
COMMENTARY
By James J. Kilpatrick
This was the allegation, and an ugly one it was: On the night of Sept. 21, 1994, two football players
at Virginia Polytechnic Institute repeatedly raped young Christy Brzonkala. They had met her less than
half an hour earlier. It was a degrading attack.
In February 1995 she recognized Antonio J. Morrison and James Crawford as her assailants. Because
the crime had occurred in a student dormitory, she complained to the VPI judicial committee. The
committee acquitted Crawford but suspended Morrison for two
semesters. On appeal, VPI found Morrison guilty only of "abusive conduct" and reinstated him for the
fall semester. Because she feared for her Isafety if Morrison would be on the campus, Brzonkala
withdrew from the university.
Question: Was this brutal incident an act substantially affecting interstate commerce?
The question arises under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. This is not a criminal statute.
The act is predicated on the power delegated to Congress to regulate commerce among the states. Its
purpose is to protect the civil rights of women who are victims of gender-motivated violence. Under
the act, women may sue their assailants for both compensatory and punitive damages.
That is what Brzonkala did in the VPI case. Last March she sued Morrison, Crawford and VPI in
U.S. District Court in Roanoke. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. They argued that the
congressional act goes beyond the power vested in Congress by the commerce clause.
On July 26, Chief Judge Jackson L. Kiser granted the motion and held the act unconstitutional. He
dismissed the suit. The government has appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4h Circuit, where
the case is now pending for oral argument.
While all this was going on in Virginia, Jane Doe in Connecticut sued her anonymous husband, John
Doe. She alleged that over a period of 17 years, he had systematically inflicted upon her "a violent
pattern of physical and moral abuse and cruelty." He had compelled her even to lay out his clothes "for
his numerous dates with his many girlfriends and mistresses."
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The husband moved to dismiss on the same grounds advanced in Virginia- that the act of Congress
violates the Constitution. This time the outcome was dramatically different: U.S. District Judge Janet
Arterton, a newcomer to the federal bench, held June 19 that the act is constitutional.
"A rational basis exists for concluding that gender-based violence is a national problem with
substantial impact on interstate commerce," Judge Arterton said. She quoted congressional findings that
such violence restricts travel and employment opportunities for women, increases health expenditures,
reduces consumer spending, diminishes national productivity and bars women from full participation in
the national economy.
Every week, Judge Arterton noted, 2,000 women are raped; every year 4 million women are battered
by husbands or partners. An individual act may not affect interstate commerce; cumulatively the assaults
create a national problem subject to federal legislation.
Before Jane Doe's suit could go to trial, the case was settled out of court.
What about it? Both Judge Kiser in Virginia and Judge Arterton in Connecticut worked from the
same materials. Both judges studied the congressional reports. Both judges reviewed the Supreme
Court's opinion in the landmark Lopez case of 1995, in which the high court
ruled that the Gun-Free Zone Act of 1990 carried the commerce clause out of bounds and was hence
unconstitutional.
Both judges went back to the 1942 case of an Ohio farmer, Roscoe Filburn, who raised 23 acres of
wheat on his own land, using his own seed, and consumed all but a small part of the harvest at home.
The Supreme Court held that his operation was a part of interstate commerce.
Judge Arterton thought the Filburn case bolstered her reasoning. Judge Kiser had the better view.
Wheat is a commodity. Violence is not. The impact of 100,000 Roscoe Filburns could have a
measurable effect on the wheat market. The rape of Christy Brzonkala was a
terrible thing, but the economic consequences of even 100,000 such assaults are wholly conjectural. The
relationship between gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce, said Judge Kiser, is "too
tenuous" to pass the constitutional test.
The Virginia jurist advanced the better reasoning. As the Lopez case made clear, the regulation of
interstate commerce has its limits. The Violence Against Women Act goes beyond them into a realm
beyond the reach of Congress. I hope the 4th Circuit sees it that way.
The Tampa Tribune Copyright 01997.
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CENSUS METHODOLOGY: HEAD COUNTING OR SAMPLING?
By Darren Welch
A proposed change to the way the federal census is taken could possibly correct the traditional
undercounting of minorities in the population. Review by the Supreme Court of a recent federal court
opinion striking the proposed new method of counting the population could result in changed voting
districts, reapportionment of congressional seats, and altered disbursements of Federal money to the
states.
The current methodology for conducting the national census is to count actual numbers of all people.
A proposed change to a sampling method was struck in federal court on August 25, 1998 after House
Republican leader Newt Gingrich brought suit against the Census Bureau to challenge the new sampling
methodology. The court did not rule on whether the sampling method violated the Constitution, but
instead based its decision on 1957 and 1976 statutes dealing with the once-a-decade national census.
The political ramifications of using the sampling method could be very significant. The sampling
method would perhaps be more accurate in counting minorities, who are traditionally underrepresented
in the national census. The 1990 census was reportedly very inaccurate, double-counting over four
million people and undercounting millions more. Given the narrow margin by which the Republicans
hold majorities in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, any change in voting districts
(which are determined by the census) could have an enormous political effect.
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COURT VOIDS PLAN TO USE SAMPLING FOR 2000 CENSUS
The New York Times
August 25, 1998
Steven A. Holmes
A Federal court ruled unanimously today that the Census Bureau's plans to use statistical sampling to
supplement the 2000 census violated Federal law.
The Census Bureau had hoped to use sampling to avoid a repetition of the 1990 census, which missed
8.4 million people and counted 4.4 million either twice or in the wrong place while relying exclusively
on traditional head-counting.
Those who stood to gain by sampling included minority groups, whose members have been
disproportionately undercounted.
The issue has achieved a heightened importance because census data are used to apportion House seats
and draw boundaries for Congressional districts. With House Republicans holding a razor-thin majority,
both parties are acutely conscious of any question that might give one side an advantage.
Beyond the partisan wrangling, the issue is of grave concern to cities because some Federal money is
allocated on the basis of population.
The decision was welcomed by Congressional Republicans, whose leader, Speaker Newt Gingrich of
Georgia, had brought the lawsuit against the Census Bureau and the Commerce Department. Excerpts,
Page A13. The Republicans contended sampling would lead to new errors and be subject to political
manipulation. But it dismayed Democrats, who thought that the system would count minority voters
missed under recent censuses and that counting them would produce new Congressional and legislative
districts likely to vote Democratic.
Opponents of sampling said that the method violated Federal law and the Constitution, which declared
that the Federal Government was required to conduct an "actual enumeration" every 10 years. But the
special three-judge panel, specifically charged by Congress with hearing census issues, sidestepped the
constitutional issue and ruled that the scheme was not permitted under the 1957 and 1976 Federal laws
that govern the census. The unanimous decision stressed that the court found no need to decide whether
sampling was constitutional because it said the Clinton Administration had wrongly interpreted the
Federal law.
The decision can be appealed directly to the Supreme Court, and the Administration is expected to do
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so.
The judges deciding the issue today were Douglas Ginsburg, an appellate court judge, and Royce C.
Lamberth, a district court judge, both appointed by President Ronald Reagan, and Ricardo Urbina, a
district court judge named by President Clinton. The panel issued an injunction prohibiting the Census
Bureau from using statistical sampling in the next census. In the meantime, the ruling is expected to
provide ammunition to Republicans who have been waging a protracted political and legislative battle
against sampling.
"I hope this gets the Administration's attention," said Representative Dan Miller, a Florida Republican
who is chairman of the House subcommittee on the census. "This is a unanimous decision -- one judge
appointed by President Clinton. The wise thing to do is put all their resources into a full enumeration."
But proponents of sampling said today they still hoped for a favorable decision from the Supreme
Court. "Ultimately, it will be before the Supreme Court," said Representative Carolyn B. Maloney, a
Manhattan Democrat. "Nothing has really changed. The nation needs an accurate count that includes
everyone."
The Census Bureau's planned sampling methodology was loosely similar to that of public opinion polls
in that it would extrapolate information about the population from partial data. But the bureau's plans
are more sophisticated. They involve using traditional methods to count everyone in 90 percent of the
households in a census tract -- a neighborhood of about 1,700 dwellings. Data from the 90 percent
would be used to determine the number and characteristics of the remaining 10 percent, and a further
adjustment of the population would be made on the basis of a survey of 750,000 households.
Today's decision was particularly galling to representatives of undercounted minority groups. "It's
inexplicable," said Eric Rodriguez, senior policy analyst with the National Council of La Raza, a Hispanic
advocacy organization. "I don't understand it. We had an undercount of 5 percent of the Latino
population in 1990. If this ruling is upheld we have no reason to expect anything but a 5 percent
undercount this time."
Because of large concentrations of blacks in inner cities and increased numbers of immigrants, mainly
in the Southwest -- two groups that have notoriously low response rates to mailed census questionnaires
-- the 1990 census was the first in modern history to miss more people than the census that preceded it.
Today's ruling turned on an interpretation of two seemingly contradictory provisions in the Census
Acts of 1957 and 1976. The 1957 act said that "except for the determination of population for
apportionment purposes," the Secretary of Commerce "may, where he deems it appropriate, authorize
the use of the statistical method known as sampling." The wording codified the practice of sending the
census long form -- the questionnaire that asks how many bathrooms there are in the home, for example
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-- to one in six households.
In 1976, Congress changed the language of the law, saying that except for purposes of
reapportionment, the Commerce Secretary "shall" authorize the use of sampling.
Justice Department lawyers had argued that by changing the wording to make sampling mandatory
rather than optional, Congress had effectively removed the prohibition against it for reapportionment
purposes. Further they argued that in 1976 Congress added amendments -- Section 141 -- to the act that
directed the Commerce Secretary to conduct a census every 10 years "in such form and content as he
may determine, including the use of sampling procedures and special surveys."
In today's ruling, written by Judge Lamberth, the panel disagreed with the Justice Department's
reasoning.
"Though defendants' interpretation of the except/shall sentence structure is proper in some instances,
the court finds it to be strained and incorrect when applied to the amended section 195," he wrote. He
stressed the importance of the census to the balance of power in Congress between parties and between
states, and said it was hard to imagine that Congress would change the rules without explicitly saying
so. He quoted from Justice William H. Rehnquist in a 1980 decision:
"In a case where the construction of legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so
relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives may take into
consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night."
In bargaining last November over the spending bill that covered the Census Bureau, Mr. Gingrich won
Administration agreement to allow general tax revenues to pay for the litigation, a deal that enraged
many House Democrats.
"They bought him the gun and said 'shoot me,'" said a Democratic staffer who spoke on the condition
of anonymity, "and the court did."
The White House was confident the court would rule that Mr. Gingrich lacked standing to bring the
suit since he could not show how the bureau's plans would cause injury to the House. White House
lawyers were also confident that the court would decide that because the Administration and Republicans
were still haggling, the case was not yet "ripe" for a court ruling.
Today's ruling went against the Administration on both counts.
Proposal for 2000 Census Involves 3 Sets of Samples
A plan proposed by the Census Bureau to use statistical sampling to augment the 2000 census would
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use three sets of samples. The first set would check a selection of houses in a given census tract -- about
1,700 households -- that are presumed to be vacant. The second would check a proportion of residences
from which forms were not returned. And the last would be a random nationwide sample to check for
accuracy.
The Postal Service in 2000 will probably estimate that 5 percent of the 119 million residential
addresses in the country are vacant, the Census Bureau said. Normally, census forms are not sent to
those addresses. But studies have shown that at least 11 percent of the homes the Postal Service said
were empty were, in fact, occupied.
The bureau, rather than sending forms, would send counters to I in 10 of the houses that Postal
Service records show as vacant. The number of those dwellings found to be occupied, and the number
of people living in them would then be used to estimate the population in housing units that were thought
to be vacant nationwide.
In 1990, the bureau sent enumerators to the 35 percent of all addresses that did not return their mail-in
census forms. In 2000, the percentage visited would depend on how many households in each census
tract mailed in their forms. If 80 percent of the households in a tract returned a form, the bureau would
visit half of those houses that did not respond. If 30 percent of the addresses mailed the forms, census
takers would visit 6 out of 7 of those households that did not respond.
The bureau's goal was to have a response by mail or visit from 90 percent of the dwellings in each of
the country's 60,000 census tracts. Using the information gathered, the bureau would estimate the
number and characteristics of the remaining 10 percent.
Finally, the bureau would randomly select 750,000 households nationwide, making sure that each state
and all racial, age, economic and other demographic groups were represented. This sample would be
used as a "quality control" to check the accuracy of the bureau's efforts and to make adjustments where
necessary.
Copyright 1998 The New York Times Company
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